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,I\ 
Spanish authorities used two agencies to occupy and control California as a 
royal province from 1769 to 1821: the church and the army. While the story of the 
missions and the missionaries has been thoroughly chronicled, little attention has been 
focused on the men who comprised Spain's military forces. This thesis examines the 
experience of the royal soldier in California to determine his significance in the Golden 
State's Spanish colonial era. 
2 
The journals, diaries, and correspondence of the soldiers, missionaries, 
explorers, traders, and foreign rivals who visited or occupied the province comprise a 
major part' of the source material. The variety of viewpoints represented by these · 
documents facilitated examination from several perspectives. Another valuable primary 
source was the Spanish frontier regulations, which provided the royal perspective on 
the military enterprise. Published materials based on documents in the major archival 
repositories such as those in Mexico, Spain, and the Bancroft Library in California 
were accessible through works in the Portland State University Library and the Oregon 
Historical Society which supplied sources pertinent to this investigation. Secondary 
works by historians provided both a historical background and data on specific aspects 
of a soldier's life. Cited periodical articles concentrated more specifically on the 
military experience both in California and the Spanish northern frontier. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Spanish army played a vital role in maintaining royal control over New 
Spain's province of California.! During the fifty-two years of service, 1769-1821, the 
king' s soldiers constructed four defensive forts or "presidios," fought pitched battles 
with both native tribesmen and Latin American revolutionaries, protected the 
Franciscan priests and their missions, founded two towns, and established the non-
indigenous population. Yet despite five decades of duty against a potentially dangerous 
indigenous population and such foreign rivals as Great Britain and Russia this military 
force has been largely overlooked by historians. No single book has focused on Spain's 
California army despite the attention paid to the colorful history of this nation's most 
populous state. 
The reason for this neglect is the domination of the Spanish era by two giants of 
California history: Franciscan missionaries Junlpero Serra and Fermin de Lasuen. 
Serving as California mission presidents from 1769 to 1803, they accounted for the 
founding of eighteen of the province's twenty-one missions. Through the mission 
system agriculture, stock raising, and various crafts were introduced to the province. 
The religious compounds during the Lasuen era were responsible for 50,000 converts 
compared to a population of only 3,700 non-Indian inhabitants of the presidios and 
towns at the end of the Spanish era. The Franciscans initiated trade with American 
ships and the missions were the economic backbone of the province, often providing 
food and other essentials necessary for the soldier's survival. The legacy of these two 
men is still seen today in the restored missions along the king's highway. 
2 
As a result the mission system in general and J unipero Serra in particular have 
been the subject of numerous studies. 2 Cast in the shadow of the missionaries the royal 
troopers are the forgotten players of Spanish California history. The purpose of this 
paper is to illuminate their roles as defenders of the province by examining the 
elements of their service. This thesis is not intended to be a history of this era and a 
discussion of the missions is avoided unless relevant to the military institution. I believe 
that by concentrating more directly on the soldierly aspects of the presidia! units can 
their garrison duty be evaluated and appreciated; hence the emphasis on conditions of 
service rather than major historical figures or events. Only in this way can the 
contribution of the presidials be properly acknowledged. 
The Spanish military first occupied California in 1769 to improve the defenses 
of New Spain by creating a defensive buffer against such foreign powers as England 
and Russia whose naval and commercial elements were known to be operating in the 
north Pacific region. This step was part of a program throughout the northern 
borderlands of New Spain to create a more efficient and effective defensive posture 
against both foreign threats and the intractible natives of the Texas, New Mexico, and 
Arizona frontiers. The purpose of this effort was to protect the valuable silver mines of 
northern Mexico whose riches were vital to the economies of both New Spain and the 
mother country. 3 Part of this program was the appointment in 1765 of Jose de G3.1vez 
by King Charles III as visitador general to New Spain. He received broad powers to 
improve administrative and economic efficiency in the region. In the same year the 
Spanish monarch also commissioned Cayetano Maria Pignatelli Rubf Corbera y San 
Climent, the Marques de Rub{, to inspect and reorganize the presidios in northern New 
Spain to better control the Indian threat to frontier security. The result of Rub{' s 
activities was the Reglamento de Presidios, in 1772, which realigned the frontier forts 
and established the administrative machinery for all borderland presidios. 4 While Rub{ 
dealt with native uprisings G3.1vez heard rumors of foreign threats to New Spain's 
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Pacific shores. In the 1740's British captain George Anson had touched the 
viceroyality's west coast. The myth of the Strait of Anian, a water passage across the 
North American continent, caused Spanish fears of British expansion from the north. 
Stories circulated of a force of three hundred Russians killed in battle with Pacific 
Northwest tribesmen. s In 1768 the Spanish ambassador to Russia sent Madrid a report 
indicating that Empress Catherine II had ordered secret preparations for exploration 
designed to expand Russian New World territory. This information resulted in a 
dispatch to Galvez warning him of planned Russian settlements on the California coast. 
The visitador general recommended to New Spain's viceroy, Carlos Francisco de 
Croix, that California be occupied to prevent Russian and British incursions. In 
October 1768 Galvez received news of the king' s approval. 6 
Galvez planned to use the port of San Diego as a base in the south of the new 
province, and Monterey, long on the naval charts since its discovery by Sebastian 
Vizcaino in 1602, would serve as California's defense bastion and port of call for the 
Manila Galleon. The visitador general had established the Pacific coast port of San Bias 
in Baja California in 1768 as a base for naval operations and logistics center for Sonora 
Indian campaigns. San Bias also became the primary supplier of California. 7 
In January 1769 the ship San Carlos with sixty-two men sailed from La Paz 
harbor in Baja California, followed in February by the San Antonio with a complement 
of twenty-eight. They landed at San Diego in April and were soon met by two land 
expeditions. Captain Fernando Rivera y Moncada arrived from Velicata in Baja 
California with twenty-five soldiers _in May and on July 1 Gaspar de Portola, the 
governor of Baja California, reinforced the expedition with a squad of soldiers and 
Father Junfpero Serra, president of the Baja California Franciscan missions. Despite 
many deaths from scurvy Portola journeyed north with sixty-two soldiers, friars, and 
Indians to establish a presidio at Monterey. Unable to recognize it from Vizcafno's 
description the Baja California governor returned to San Diego. He led a second 
expedition the following year that founded the Presidio of Monterey as the capital of 
the new province. The Spanish military presence in California had been established. 8 
Eventually two additional presidios were built at San Francisco and Santa Barbara. 
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The presence of Father Serra in the original founding expedition underscores the 
importance of the mission on the frontier in general and in California in particular. 
Indeed, the role of the military was often seen as subservient to the mission enterprise. 
With an initial occupying force of only fifty-one soldiers to control the estimated 
70,000 natives living near the settled area missions were needed to introduce and 
encourage white civilization. Successful religious establishments enabled Spain to 
control vast territories like California with few troops by attempting to create new 
Hispanic citizens. The Franciscan fathers changed Indian society by introducing 
European agriculture, food, and draft animals. Education in language and manual 
trades enabled the neophytes to build most mission compounds. By 1806 over 20,000 
natives lived at the California missions which numbered twenty by the end of the 
Spanish era. 9 
The Spanish authorities promoted the missionaries I role in California. In the 
Reglamento de Presidios Viceroy Antonio Marfa Bucareli is ordered by King Carlos 
III to place "special attention" to California Is security and 11 above all II the spread of 
Christianity .10 In 1781 Commandant of the Interior Provinces Teodoro de Croix, who 
had jurisdiction over California, encouraged the founding of new missions to "reduce 
dociley the numerous small bands of barbarians that are vagrant in the territory ... " 11 In 
a 1794 report to Viceroy Marques De Branciforte on California's security royal 
engineer captain Miguel Costans6 viewed the primary duties of the province 1 s soldiers 
as assisting in the conversion and civilizing of the natives, and maintaining peace 
between neophytes and intractible tribes. He believed that the best defense for 
California was to populate the territory with more settlers from New Spain, to provide 
a larger military force and more quickly control the natives.12 
Despite the small garrisons and preeminence of the religious enterprise in 
civilizing the province the soldiers still played a vital role. Indeed, the Franciscan 
fathers depended upon the small military escort garrisons at each mission for survival. 
They protected the missionaries, served as policemen to prevent trouble from 
recalcitrants, and tracked fugitive neophytes. The soldiers also served as a Christian 
example to the mission population. Their character and actions could often determine 
the success or failure of the religious conversion effort.l3 
By guarding the missions the troopers protected the efforts to create a loyal 
Spanish population and thereby prevent foreign encroachment in the province. 
Eventually the presidios themselves became centers of California social and political 
activity. The military families were the basis for the later Hispanic population and the 
soldiers often retired to the two civil pueblos founded during the Spanish era, San Jose 
and Los Angeles. These towns in turn provided recruits for the presidios.14 
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The following chapters will illustrate the difficulties the military experienced in 
fullfilling these roles. Inadequate complements garrisoned the presidios. Recruits often 
lacked education, training, and good character. Uniforms, weaponry and ammunition 
were usually in poor repair or short supply. Starvation threatened the province's initial 
presidials. The last decade of Spanish rule witnessed a complete breakdown of the 
salary and supply system, the troopers serving without pay and their families destitute. 
Outnumbered troopers fought pitched battles with both natives and Latin American 
revolutionaries. However, when the Spanish flag was lowered in California for the last 
time in 1822 it was not due to battlefield defeat or retreat. Events occurring outside the 
province had caused a change in sovereignty. Spain's California army had fulfilled its 
duty.lS 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER I 
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Spanish rule. "Baja" (lower) or "Viejo" (old) California refers to the Mexican 
peninsula and state still retaining that name. 
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CHAPTER II 
RECRUITING AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND 
The men who served in the garrisons of California were generally not ideal 
military material. As was the case throughout the Spanish borderlands the average 
recruit was poor, illiterate, ignorant of weaponry and often of questionable character. 
Born on the frontier their low social status often caused conflicts with their superiors 
and Franciscan missionaries. Inadequate supply, meagre salary and long enlistment 
terms encouraged desertion. Many officers also lacked the necessary leadership ability. 
However, their borderlands background created tough soldiers used to hardship and 
deprivation. Possessing the skills necessary for successful duty in a frontier 
environment, they were able to meet the challenges posed by California service. 
Recruiting for service in the California presidios was controlled by the Marques 
de Rubf's Reglamento de Presidios, which governed the entire line of New Spain's 
frontier presidios from Texas to California. This ordinance stipulated that recruits must 
be between sixteen and thirty-six years of age and at least five feet tall.l Recruiting 
captains were not to ignore any faults in "health, hardiness, or resolution." Because 
frontier troops were in a constant state of war with the borderlands Indians they "must 
be of the highest quality and calibre" and had equal right to promotion, honors, rank, 
salary, and retirement pay as the regular Spanish forces. The term of enlistment was 
ten years.2 
Despite generally ignoring these enlistment qualifications recruiting officers had 
difficulty gathering inductees for frontier service. California duty was particularly 
unpopular because low pay and problems in supplying the somewhat isolated presidios 
' 
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caused real hardships among the soldiers who posted there. A private's pay was 290 
pesos annually from which the paymaster deducted the amount needed to purchase 
horses, uniforms, weapons, and equipment. The soldier actually received two reales a 
day in coin (eight reales equalled one peso) for himself and his family's subsistence. In 
addition, twenty pesos a year were withheld for five years to be given to the soldier 
upon discharge. 3 For a period of time California troops were paid entirely in goods and 
were forced to pay high surcharges on supplies due to the expense of shipping goods to 
San Diego and Monterey. A letter from Commandant General Teodoro de Croix 
reveals the impact of these salary policies upon California recruiting: 
The false interpretation which the people have given to the 
Reglamento de Californias, persuading them of the greatest 
detriments in the surcharges or discounts there made against the 
salaries of Officers, troops, and pobladores, may prevent many from 
taking advantage of the opportunity. . . for gaining an honorable and 
happy berth and of performing a loyal service to the King. . . 4 
New regulations enacted in 1781 corrected this "false interpretation" by 
stipulating that goods in California be sold at the same prices as in Mexico and the 
soldiers paid their two reales a day. The reduction of a private's salary to 217.50 pesos 
was compensated by increased buying power. 5 
Despite this improvement problems with pay and supply would always hamper 
recruiting for service in California. Even soldiers currently serving on the frontier and 
used to frontier conditions tried to evade assignment to California garrisons and once 
assigned, often tried to desert.6 Francisco Pal6u, a mission father, wrote, "In view of 
this [referring to low salary] and of the privations they suffer ... it is surprising that 
anyone be found willing to be a soldier, whereas formerly it was necessary to use 
testimonials or influence to obtain such a place. "7 
Nevertheless, there were some advantages of joining the frontier military forces. 
The army offered steady employment, retirement benefits, a pension for widows, and 
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access to the only skilled medical attention in the borderlands. There was opportunity 
for promotion, as junior officers on the frontier had generally risen through the ranks. 
The men earned the same ranks and privileges of the regular Spanish army and, 
because the royal authorities wanted to colonize the borderlands region, land was easily 
obtained near the presidio after discharge. 8 Finally, as an added inducement, the 
regulations provided that soldiers were entitled to any spoils of war after a successful 
engagement with the Indians. 9 The men who answered the call to arms were generally 
mixed-blood mestizos from the ranches and villages of the northern borderland 
provinces of Baja California, Sinaloa, and Sonora. There were some Indians as well. 
Usually from poor families, they joined the army because it was the best opportunity 
available to them.lO In New Spain most good soldier material was prohibited from 
joining the military due to occupational deferments so these men were the only ones 
eligible for service. Miners, farmers, muleteers, and hacienda managers were all 
excluded from army duty. The California recruit averaged thirty-two years of age and, 
during the early California colonial period, was usually unmarried.11 
A common practice in New Spain was to release convicts from prison directly 
to the military in order to relieve crowded jails and alleviate the army's manpower 
shortage. Some men found themselves sentenced directly to the military or were given 
the option of being a prisoner or a soldier. Some of these convicts ended up in the 
California garrisons.12 
While most of these men may have stemmed from rather humble social 
backgrounds, the ones raised in the borderland provinces possessed frontier experience 
that made them ideally suited to service in California. Strong, tough, and used to harsh 
weather, these men often more resembled cowboys than soldiers. They often did not 
understand the use of firearms, their military duties, or penal law, but their skill at 
horsemanship amazed foreign visitors to the province.13 George Vancouver, a British 
sea captain who visited California in 1792, witnessed the roping and slaughter of 
several wild cattle for a feast at Santa Clara Mission. Commenting on the "skill and 
adroitness" necessary to catch the wild bulls the British captain was impressed by the 
"great dexterity" displayed by the mounted California troopers during the roundup.14 
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If a frontier rearing gave these men equestrian skills and a mental and physical 
toughness to the elements, it also caused them to lack much formal education. Illiteracy 
was a major problem among the California forces. In 1785 only fourteen out of fifty 
soldiers at the Monterey presidio could read and write and in the same year only seven 
of the thirty men at the San Francisco garrison were literate. By 1794 there was not one 
literate enlisted soldier at San Francisco.15 Governor Felipe de Neve recognized this 
problem by requiring that candidates for vacant sergeancies be "from among those who 
have most distinguished themselves for good conduct and bravery; taking care, as far as 
possible, that they shall know how to read and write." 16 
According to regulations, an illiterate could not achieve the rank of corporal, 
thus making literacy a key to promotion. If soldiers were literate and could handle the 
presidia! accounts promotion tended to be rapid, which reflected the value of an 
educated soldier in California. Ex-convict Hermenegildo Sal, sent to the province from 
the prisons of Mexico and a man o( some education, eventually became commander of 
the Santa Barbara and San Francisco presidios.17 
Despite regulations there was a general lack of educated non-commissioned 
officers in the army of New Spain thus making the education of good soldiers difficult. 
No schools were established in California until 1795 when Diego Borica had assumed 
the office of governor. Previously officers had taught their own offspring and military 
wives had instructed the presidia! children and a few soldiers who wanted advancement 
to corporal. Many of the first schoolteachers were soldiers, some of whom were 
retired. IS In 1815 Governor Pablo Vicente de Sola brought two educators from Spain 
to Monterey in an attempt to establish a school of higher learning. Upon discovering 
the lack of possibilities for advanced education in the province both teachers 
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immediately returned to Madrid. Governor Sola later established a school in Monterey 
and paid the teachers from his own private funds but eventually political upheavals 
deprived him of his income and forced him to abandon the project.19 
Bachelors were preferred in both the frontier forces and regular army units of 
New Spain because married men were often more concerned about their families and 
neglected their duties. The first presidia! troopers in California at Monterey and San 
Diego were veteran Indian fighters from the fort at Loreto in Baja California who had 
come with Portola in 1769. In 1773 the Spanish population of California consisted of 
sixty-one soldiers, eleven friars, and no women. Although six soldiers had taken native 
brides, the rest were either single or had left their wives in Mexico. 20 It became 
obvious, however, that in California married men with families possessed more 
desirable attributes for garrisoning the province. The Indians reacted hostily to single 
men, believing them to be outcasts who had come to their land to steal their women. 
The mission fathers were especially concerned about interaction between single men 
and the natives. The soldiers spread venereal disease and concubinage was common. As 
a result the president of the California missions, Junipero Serra, wrote to Viceroy 
Bucareli in 1774 and urged him to select twenty to thirty men with families from the 
Sonora presidios in Mexico to replace the current California garrison in order that "the 
land would be purged of all the scandalous and we would have soldiers suited to the 
nature of these [spiritual] conquests. "21 The introduction of families also helped to 
populate the province and assure Spanish control. 
Beginning in 1774 the emphasis was to bring married soldiers and families into 
the province. Rivera y Moncada led fifty-one people of all ages and both sexes to San 
Diego from Sinaloa, thus bringing the first white women into California, and providing 
brides for the soldiers there. Several families were also included in this group. The next 
year, following Bucareli's orders, Captain Juan Bantista de Anza recruited in Sonora 
and Sinaloa some twenty soldiers with families "submerged in poverty" and ten married 
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soldiers from the Sonora presidios. These men were used to establish a new presidio at 
San Francisco.22 
In 1781 Teodoro de Croix ordered Rivera y Moncada to bring fifty-nine new 
recruits and soldiers from the provinces of Sonora and Jalisco to found a new presidio 
at Santa Barbara. These men were to be married and "healthy, robust, and without 
human vice or defect." Twenty-one married men and twenty-five men with families 
were signed up. Only eight men were single. Without exception the sons and daughters 
of these soldiers stayed in California and later intermarried with the other soldiers' or 
settlers' families in the province. An additional twenty-four families were enlisted to 
establish a pueblo at Los Angeles. One of the enticements for these pioneers was that 
the unmarried female members were offered "the possibility that they may marry 
members of the troops who remain single in California for lack of Spanish women. "23 
These three expeditions formed the basis of the California population during the 
Spanish period. By 1790 two-thirds of the two hundred soldiers then in California were 
married and living with families. The presidios themselves eventually became large 
settlements with families living on the ranches outside the forts. These families and the 
ones in the civil towns of Los Angeles and San Jose furnished the new recruits to 
replace the original presidials of Anza and Portola whose enlistments had expired. 24 
Despite bringing wives and families to California the attempt to create a more 
socially stable environment was not altogether successful. The character of the soldiers 
was often held in question, especially by the mission fathers. Class prejudice that was 
prevalent in Mexico did not disappear in California. The soldiers were often 
disrespectful to the European-born priests, who treated the mixed-bloods with equal 
discourtesy. The priests feared the sexual appetites and irreverent attitudes of the 
presidials. Eventually the soldiers refused to aid in the construction of missions or their 
own presidia! chapels, even when under orders by their officers to do so. The military 
guards attached to Mission San Juan Capistrano were forced at gunpoint to assist in 
building the mission because they rebelled at a reprimand given by a mission father. 
Father Lasuen was to complain that "Little is gained ... by assigning to the missions 
soldiers who are less efficient, weak in discipline, and poorly equipped. "25 In 1783 
Father Pal6u of Mission San Francisco refused to say mass at the presidio because of 
the negative attitude of the soldiers who ridiculed anyone who conversed with a priest 
with the derogatory name of "frailero. "26 
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Presidials assigned guard duty at the missions were a constant source of trouble 
to the priests. Ignoring admonitions to be good Christian examples to the mission 
Indians, the soldiers were accused by the missionaries of gambling, selling equipment, 
shirking duties, drinking and pursuing Indian women. Father Serra wanted removed 
from the mission guard any soldier who "sets a bad example, especially in matters of 
chastity. "27 
Perhaps the worst example of poor character among soldiers assigned to 
missions occured during the building of San Gabriel Mission in 1771. The men refused 
to work, engaged in fights, and did not obey the corporal in charge. They would go out 
in groups of six or more and lasso Indian women like cattle to rape them. Young boys 
who came to the mission also were molested. An assault on a chiers wife finally led to 
a minor Indian revolt. 28 
Every effort was made to prevent assaults on Indian women. Soldiers were 
prohibited from entering Indian villages for any reason except to accompany a priest 
and even then a soldier could not leave the presence of the missionary. Any infraction 
of these rules would result in severe punishment. Father Serra always located the 
missions at a distance from the presidios and segregated the housing for married and 
unmarried women. 29 
Gambling and drinking were also problems among the soldiers. An American 
visitor to the California coast described the presidials as a "mixed breed" who "are of 
an indolent, harmless disposition and fond of spirituous liquors." This fondness was 
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strictly prohibited and hard labor, imprisonment and time in the stocks were the result 
of violations. Card playing was also forbidden, not on moral grounds but because of 
the soldiers' addiction to it. Officers even lost horses and weapons in card games. All 
decks were to be seized and burned.30 Desertion was a problem in the early years of 
the Spanish occupation before social stability and adequate food supplies were 
established. In 1771 ten men deserted from the San Diego presidio but the commandant 
was so desperate for troops that he sent out a priest with a blank pardon to bring them 
back, which he did. Two weeks later six more men fcom the same garrison deserted, 
stole some beef cattle, armed themselves, and when confronted by the commandant, 
refused to surrender. They were also later returned by a priest. The shortage of military 
forces during the early days of the California colony was so acute that Viceroy Bucareli 
granted the military commandant at Monterey the power to proclaim a general pardon 
for all deserters. Considering the low pay, supply problems, and menial tasks that these 
troops were often asked to perform they had little incentive to become good soldiers. 31 
Despite these problems and the various complaints by the mission fathers, most 
men were rarely convicted of crimes. The occurrences of rape and murder were 
isolated enough to indicate that the presidia! troops were not any more prone to 
immoral behavior than any of the other military forces of New Spain. This is especially 
true when one considers that the regular Spanish units of the time were filled with 
various undesirables of the lower socio-economic classes. Even the convicts sent to 
California were released because of good behavior to relieve prison overcrowding. In 
the criminal cases that did reach the trial stage often the evidence against the soldiers 
was not conclusive and the commandant may have brought charges to appease the 
mission fathers or maintain discipline. 32 
The officers who commanded the presidia! rank and file were generally from the 
frontier themselves. This was different from general practice in New Spain as most 
officers of regular regiments were either peninsulares (born in Spain) or criollos (born 
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in America of European bloodlines) and there was often rivalry between the two 
groups. Spanish officers especially had racist attitudes towards the common Mexican 
soldiers who they often regarded as "contemptible colonials" and frequently attributed 
their failures to inferior breeding. European officers were not enthusiastic about 
commanding the principally mestizo forces in the isolated borderlands presidios. In the 
1790's the French revolution forced the Spanish military establishment to keep 
experienced officers at home, thus decreasing the number of peninsulares available for 
command. 33 The attitude of peninsular officers, the diminishing number of European 
officers in New Spain, and the special demands of frontier leadership made it apparent 
that the best candidates for borderlands command were men with frontier experience. 
The presidia! regulations themselves stipulated that men with frontier experience be 
given preference for officer vacancies. The 1781 regulations for governing the 
Californias stated that the governor was to propose candidates for all commissioned 
officer vacancies to the commandant general and presidial commanders were to 
nominate soldiers for the non-commissioned officer openings to the governor, thereby 
ensuring that men with local frontier experience would be elevated into leadership 
positions. The religious community also recognized the value of borderland experience. 
Father Serra urged the viceroy to fill officer vacancies with frontier veterans, because 
California soldiering was "totally different" from the regular military. 34 
Promotion to officer status in California usually occurred after enlistment in the 
ranks and several years of service. Because of their undistinguished birth officers did 
not qualify as soldados distinguidos, which might have earned them a cadetship. A 
cadetship made it necessary for a soldier to equip himself, provide for a horse and 
possess the financial means to associate with other officers on a social basis. This 
required a wealthy family or contacts at the royal court, which California officers 
generally did not have.35 
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The initial presidia! commanders were veteran Indian fighters, but as this threat 
diminished managerial and accounting skills became paramount in order to oversee the 
presidia! economy and properly receive foreign visitors to the California ports. San 
Francisco commandant Jose Darlo and Santa Barbara commandant Felipe de 
Goycoechea both received their appointments because of skillful public land 
distribution in the pueblo of Los Angeles and the successful transference of presidia! 
treasuries during the reorganization of forts in the interior provinces. Lieutenant Jose 
Francisco de Ortega, a trailblazer with the De Anza expedition, was passed over for 
promotion and eventually forced to retire because of mismanagement of presidia! 
accounts. Conversely, the ex-convict Hermenegildo Sal was quickly promoted to 
presidio command because of his business acumen in managing the San Francisco 
presidio warehouse. 36 
Promotion to command did not necessarily mean good leadership. Frontier officers 
were often related by blood or marriage to the men they commanded thus making it difficult to 
maintain discipline. They often had the same vices but inadequate literacy skills. Commandant 
General Croix especially complained about their gambling and drinking: "Very few gave any 
hope of improving their behavior and conduct. They openly embrace all the abominable 
excesses ... do not observe orders, (and) hide the truth ... I have no others to whom to 
tum. "37 
In 1777 California Governor Neve wrote to the viceroy about the lack of good 
commissioned officers. Presidios and expeditions were often led by sergeants and 
corporals whose poor leadership had caused disorder among the troops and deaths to 
the Indians. In 1787 Lieutenant Diego Gonzalez, commandant at San Francisco, was 
put under arrest for insubordination, gambling, failure to prevent gambling, and trading 
with the Manila Galleon. He was eventually removed from California. His 
replacement, Leon Parrilla, suffered from fits of insanity. 38 
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It was especially difficult to find officers capable of keeping the presidia! 
accounts. Governor Pedro Fages divided the officers into two classes according to their 
accounting ability, the intelligent and the stupid, and made certain any presidio did not 
have two from the same class. Ensign Lasso de·la Vega, paymaster, was arrested for 
general incompetence in handling accounts and was eventually dismissed from the army 
after having to reimburse the presidio from his own salary. Often the positions of 
commandant and paymaster were combined due to a lack of qualified personnel. 39 
While there may not have been much difference in the social backgrounds of the 
officers and enlisted men, this was not true of the officers in charge of the California 
military establishment. Suspicion regarding the trustworthiness of the criollos resulted 
in Spanish peninsular officers being appointed to all important military posts in New 
Spain, including California. With only two exceptions, all of the men in charge of the 
California forces, either as governor or military commandant, were full blooded 
Spaniards born in Spain. The two exceptions, Fernando Rivera y Moncada as military 
commandant and Jose Darfo Arguello as acting governor, were both criollos. Forty-
eight of the fifty-two years of Spanish colonial rule saw peninsular leadership in 
California. Also, all except Rivera y Moncada were of the noble class40. 
Because of the threat of both foreign and Indian attacks extensive military 
experience was also a prerequisite to command of the province. The average length of 
military service among these men was twenty-six years. Combat experience varied 
from European battlefields to Mexico's revolutionary struggles and the borderlands 
Indian campaigns. Lieutenant Pedro Pages was the only individual below the rank of 
captain to assume control of the region, most officers being lieutenant colonels. 
Promotion to colonel was achieved by all those who were formally named governor of 
California. 41 
The half-century of Spanish rule in California was primarily a time of 
establishing and building a new royal province, with defense taking a secondary role. 
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The frontier background of the province's soldiers made them well-suited to the task of 
borderland colonization, with ranching and farming skills more necessary for survival 
than disciplined military drill or marksmanship. If Spanish occupation of the territory 
had been seriously contested by the Indians or foreign powers the troopers' lack of 
martial prowess would have proven a serious handicap. The absence of such major 
combat allowed the small Hispanic population to create a viable colony despite isolation 
from New Spain's commercial, military, and civil bases. Agriculture and stock raising 
continued to develop and became important California industries and four presidio sites 
are major population centers today. 
20 
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CHAPTER III 
ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 
The troopers manning the California presidios were organized and armed 
according to regulations that were designed to modernize New Spain's military 
presence. Equipped as heavy cavalry their weapons were designed to control the Indian 
population living between San Diego and San Francisco. However, the role of a heavy 
cavalryman was actually better suited to fighting a traditional foe rather than combating 
the hit and run tactics of native warriors. Serious supply problems also made it difficult 
to adequately outfit the California soldiers for combat. Fortunately for Spain, however, 
these burdens did not prevent the royal forces from keeping the province firmly under 
Spanish control. 
The California presidios were initially organized and administered under the 
Reglamento de Presidios, as were all the frontier garrisons of northern New Spain. 
However the difficulties of providing supplies and manpower to the isolated province 
caused a separate set of rules for California to be issued by Governor Felipe de Neve in 
1781.1 
According to Neve's regulation California was divided into four military 
districts, each with a presidio. The military post was to be commanded by a lieutenant 
assisted by an ensign, sergeant, and two to five corporals. The commandant had 
military, civil, and criminal jurisdiction within his district. The governor was the 
military commander of the province and was aided by an assistant inspector of captain's 
rank. Presidia! soldiers were enlisted according to the 1772 regulations which 
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designated them as regular colonial troops but only as part of a presidio garrison. They 
had no regimental or larger unit designations. 2 
While the majority of troops in California enlisted into the presidio 'companies, 
other units served in the province's forts as well, including a regular light infantry unit 
from Spain. In 1767 the Compaflfa Franca de Voluntarios de Catalulfa was formed in 
Catalonia, Spain, to add strength to the forces in New Spain. Created from the Second 
Regiment of Light Infantry of Catalonia the Franca or "free" designation indicated that 
the unit was unattached and not assigned to any one place or regiment. As a result the 
company's one hundred men and four officers sent to America served wherever 
additional manpower was needed, including Nootka Sound, California, and the 
northern provinces of Mexico. 3 
Twenty-five Catalonian Volunteers traveled with the original expedition to 
establish a Spanish presence in California in 1769. They assisted in the founding of the 
San Diego and Monterey presidios and served in their garrisons until transferred from 
the province in 1774. A larger contingent of three officers and seventy-two men 
reinforced California in 1796 after war with France was declared. They were 
withdrawn in 1803.4 
Late in the Spanish era authorities dispatched two additional units to protect the 
province from attacks by Latin American revolutionaries. In 1819 the San Bias Infantry 
Company joined the Escuadron de Mazatlan, a cavalry unit, in augmenting the 
presidia! forces. Each company's one hundred men were distributed among the four 
posts. The cavalrymen mustered in as good soldiers but the San Bias troopers 
apparently were criminals and vagabonds taken from jails or picked up by press gangs. 
Ignorant of discipline or military drill the California settlers blamed them for many 
crimes that occurred after their arrival. 5 
The existence of shore batteries to protect the harbors at San Diego, San 
Francisco, and Monterey required the presence of trained artillerymen. Eighteen 
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gunners arrived in California from colonial artillery units in Mexico in 1796 and in 
1820 twenty additional cannoneers reinforced them. The creation of the only official 
militia formation in California as an artillery unit reveals the importance of trained 
gunners to the province. In 1805 Spanish authorities sent Ensign Jose Roca to organize 
a militia artillery company of seventy men. Primarily enrolled from the pueblos the 
men received two hours of instruction every Sunday. This unit was called into active 
service on several occasions. 6 
Indian auxiliaries often assisted the presidial troops in skirmishes against other 
Indians. The only attempt to organize them into a militia unit occurred in 1820 when 
fear of an invasion by revolutionaries from Mexico led the Franciscans at the Santa 
Barbara mission to form the compaftfa de urbanos realista de Santa Barbara. This 
force consisted of one hundred Indians armed with bows, fifty equipped with machetes, 
and thirty picked lancers. Despite a pledge of loyalty to the Spanish king their weapons 
were locked away when not used for drill and California mission president Mariano 
Payeras had some well-justified doubts about their conduct in battle. 7 
One item that separated the presidial soldiers from regular and militia units on 
the frontier was their mode of dress. The Reglamento de Presidios stipulated a colorful 
uniform to be worn by all the presidial troops throughout the borderland provinces. The 
garb consisted of a short blue woolen jacket with small cuffs and a red collar, blue 
woolen breeches and cap, and a black neckerchief, hat and shoes. Over this was worn a 
heavy leather jacket and a bandoleer of antelope hide embroidered with the presidio 
name. Leather leggings were wrapped around the lower leg and tied below the knee. A 
cartridge box completed the uniform requirements. 8 
Contemporary accounts indicated that the soldiers adhered closely to the 
regulations. American southwest explorer Zebulon Pike found the standard uniform 
made even more colorful with the addition of a red cape and the high crown of a wool 
hat wrapped with ribbons of various colors, usually a woman's gift. A blue woolen 
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cape and a plume of red wool attached to the hat supplemented the regulation uniform 
on occasion. Sometimes a striped woolen pancho was worn and officers added 
embroidered boots with large spurs. 9 
The dress of the Catalonian Volunteers is more typical of the European 
uniforms of the period. Wearing the same uniform as the Second Regiment of Light 
Infantry in Barcelona, Spain, the officers donned a blue overcoat with a high yellow 
collar and stitchings, blue breeches, a yellow waistcoat with white buttons, a black 
cravat, cotton stockings and black shoes. A gallooned hat of silver thread with a 
cockade topped the outfit. The enlisted men's uniform was similar except that it was 
made of inferior materiai.10 
The cuera or leather jacket most distinguished presidia! troopers from regular 
colonial soldiers and gave the frontier fighters the nickname "leather jacket soldiers." A 
coat without sleeves, it was constructed of several thicknesses of dressed deer skins and 
effectively stopped arrows except at very close range. Weighing eighteen pounds some 
cueras were embroidered around the edges and pockets. Their regulation color was 
white, although a few were dyed a cinnamon color preferred by some officers because 
of the camouflage effect. II 
Despite regulations which dictated that a sufficient reserve of uniforms be kept 
at each presidio the commandant found it difficult to adequately clothe his soldiers. 
Hard use and supply problems caused California governor Felipe de Neve to report in 
1777 that the soldiers' uniforms were "bordering on indecency" and supplemented with 
civilian items. Neve's 1781 regulations addressed this problem by requesting additional 
uniforms because one pair would not last a year's service. Nevertheless, the problem 
continued to persist. In 1795 Governor Diego de Borica reported that soldiers lacked 
uniforms and their families did not possess enough decent clothes for mass. Officers 
wore a frilled white dickey under their vests for lack of a shirt and enlisted men had 
patched and ragged garments. Many soldiers wore blankets and went barefoot. The 
27 
supply authorities often sent cloth instead of uniforms and the men, without tailors, 
often ruined it by poor cutting. The situation later improved because of increased trade 
with the Russians, French, English, and Americans. 12 
An effort to extend the life of the uniforms resulted in the use of a work 
uniform in some of the presidios. For livestock herding, timber cutting, and other hard 
tasks the men were permitted to wear an overcoat of turned antelope hide with gilded 
buttons and cuff and collar edging of red velveteen. Breeches were also of the same 
material. On feast days, presidial guard duty or off duty the regulation uniform was 
required.l3 
Weaponry also set apart the California soldiers from the colonial regular forces. 
According to the Reglamento de Presidios presidial troopers were to be armed with a 
lance, shield, musket, sword, and two pistols. The lance and shield had long been 
abandoned by the regular regiments, and the musket employed was a distinctly frontier 
type. To keep these weapons in serviceable condition one soldier from each presidial 
company was designated as the unit armorer and was exempt from fatigue duties. The 
regulations also stated that each presidio was to have a reserve supply so that "no 
soldier shall ever lack complete armament." 14 
The principal weapon of the presidial troopers was the lance. Handled with 
great skill by the cavalrymen, this weapon was deadly when natives were caught in the 
open, the troopers often using the kidneys as an aiming point. IS Regulations specified 
that the lance head was to be 13 1/2 inches in length and 1 1/2 inches wide with a 
double cutting edge and a projection to prevent deep thrusts that would cause difficulty 
in removing the lance. However, as local blacksmiths forged most of the blades few 
were to official specifications. Mounted on poles that varied from seven to eight feet in 
length, the troopers carried the lance fixed to the left side of the saddle at a forward 
slant five feet above the horse.l6 
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The soldiers also carried a shield made of three thicknesses of bullhide stitched 
together to deflect lance thrusts and arrows. Worn on the left arm and carried on the 
back when not in use, the shield measured approximately twenty inches in height and 
two feet in width. Officer's shields were often painted with a family crest or the royal 
arms of Spain. Enlisted men's shields were generally plain.17 
The musket specified by the Reglamento de Presidios was designed for the 
cavalry and was similar to a civilian model that had been employed on the frontier 
since the middle of the seventeenth century. The light, muzzle loading carbine used the 
inexpensive, durable, and easily maintained miguelet ignition system which made the 
weapon a good choice for the frontier. While regulations dictated a . 66 calibre gun 
with a barrellangth of 38 1/2 inches there were variations in both aspects. While on 
horseback the soldiers carried the musket in a case to the front of the saddle, crosswise, 
the breech to the right hand.18 
The two pistols issued to the frontier troops were standard Spanish cavalry 
pistols of .66 calibre with the same ignition system as the carbine. The barrel was not 
to exceed ten inches in length. Officers sometimes carried pistols with elaborate 
engraving. As with the musket there were variations as to calibre and barrel length. 
The mounted soldiers carried their pistols on each side of the saddle behind the rider .19 
The sword designated for the presidia! horsemen was also standard regular 
cavalry issue. The wide blade was double edged, 36 1/2 inches long, with an iron hilt 
and wire wrapped grip. On the frontier however, these sabres were often cut down to 
make a short sword that was employed as both a weapon and a tool and had widespread 
civilian use. The blade was approximately eighteen inches long and was useful as a 
brush knife. Cavalrymen carried the sword in a leather scabbard attached to the left 
side of the saddle under the rider's leg, hilt facing forward. When dismounted the 
scabbard was attached to a sling on the soldier's right shoulder. 20 
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A cartridge box completed the soldier's kit. Although the regulation box carried 
twenty rounds in two roles of holes there were variations. Some boxes were attached to 
the belt and some to a sling. The arms of Spain were often embroidered on the flap. 
This military article was considered of such importance by Governor Neve that in his 
1781 regulations for the province he outlined the design of a new box. Describing the 
regulation box as "inconvenient," he requested a leather-covered tin box of twenty-four 
holes in a single row, attached to a belt. 21 
For men trained to fight primarily on horseback proper saddlery was obviously 
important. The 1772 regulations specified a vaquero style saddle already popular in the 
frontier presidios and produced cheaply by local craftsmen.22 The saddle had a high 
pommel and the hardwood tree was covered with two or three layers of carved and 
embroidered leather. Wooden stirrups were closed in front and often carved into the 
figure of a lion's head or some other animal. Attached to the back of the saddle was a 
decorated armor rump for the horse made of seven panels of leather. Fastened to the 
front of the saddle and extending over the rider's legs was a leather apron intended to 
protect the cavalryman from brush and foliage. A saddlebag and blankets completed the 
soldier's tack.23 
Finally, each soldier was to have a string of six serviceable horses, one colt and 
one mule. One was to be saddled and ready for instant use in case of a surprise attack. 
Six horses were necessary because the weapons, uniform, tack and rations added 159 
pounds to the rider's own body weight. Troopers needed at least three replacement 
mounts per year due to fatigue, theft, and stampede. 24 
While the regulations provided for a well-armed and well-protected soldier the 
reality was often different. The weapons required by the royal decree in 1772 were just 
arriving on the frontier in 1780, and few were available for several years afterward. 
Ammunition was also in short supply and often the cartridges did not fit the guns. In 
1777 Governor Neve reported on the poor condition of the weapons in the California 
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presidios. He found the guns old, of the wrong calibre, and often unsafe to use. The 
swords were of poor quality and some were broken. A few troopers had neither swords 
nor lances and the cavalry mounts were so few and so old they had to be uSed in relays. 
The following year at San Francisco two thirds of the men lacked cueras and twelve 
men had no weapons or mounts. Gunpowder was also scarce, and only three pounds 
were issued annually to each soldier.25 
Compounding the supply problem was the lack of training regarding the use and 
care of weapons. Many troops relied on their lances io combat and were completely 
ignorant of the operation of their firearms. To remedy the situation Teodoro de Croix, 
the military commander of the frontier, ordered target practice to take place at each 
presidio with pistols and carbines but there was little compliance. The commandant at 
San Francisco required his men to draw twenty cartridges each week for practice at a 
blank wall, but the governor suggested that they hunt bears instead. One officer felt 
that the use of pistols should be ended because they were too dangerous to the men 
using them. They needed great care and were despised by the troops, who often tried to 
lose them on purpose. 26 
Even when the frontier soldier was well supplied there were questions as to 
whether he was given the right tools to accomplish his task. Armed and equipped as a 
heavy cavalryman, European style cavalry charges with sword and lance were effective 
against an enemy that would stand and fight hand-to-hand but were useless against the 
borderlands Indians who preferred fast, mobile combat. General Croix was especially 
critical of the cuera and believed it prevented the soldier from properly using his best 
weapon against the Indian, the musket. He also felt that its weight slowed the trooper's 
horse and made the frontier fighter less aggressive. Croix proposed replacing the 
leather jacket soldiers with light troops not equipped with the cuera, lance or shield and 
would rely on speed and surprise instead. However, due to tradition and cost, this 
change never took place. The lance was cheaper than the muskets which were in short 
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supply and the soldiers often ill-trained to use them. To further discourage firearm use 
troopers were also personally charged for cartridges fired over their allotment. The 
well-protected cavalryman was reluctant to discard his leather armor, despite its 
weight, because an Indian could shoot ten arrows at a soldier while a carbine is 
reloaded for a second shot. Some officers felt that the cuera created a more courageous 
trooper, reduced casualties, and made the Indian less confident in battle. 27 
Lacking training, weapons, and proper tactics the California soldier was 
fortunate not to be faced with an intractible native population or a full-scale European 
invasion. His punitive expeditions against the natives rarely brought great victories and 
in his only battle against a modem foe he was soundly beaten. That the presidial 
trooper proved equal to the task of maintaining Spanish control over the province is 
more a credit to his individual courage, determination and frontier background rather 
than an overwhelming superiority of weapons and tactics. 28 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRESIDIOS AND CASTILLOS 
The Spanish military in California confronted a defense problem that was 
unique to the western borderlands. Whereas military resources in northern New Spain 
had concentrated primarily against the threat of Indian rebellions, California soldiers 
prepared for European invasion by foreign powers as well. Spanish forces built two 
types of defensive structures for protection against this dual threat; the presidio to serve 
as a bulwark against native attacks and the castillo to shield against naval assault. 
The royal army established presidios at Monterey, San Diego, San Francisco, 
and Santa Barbara. The Spaniards adopted the Roman concept of deploying legionary 
fortresses on the empire's borders to control barbarians and these California forts 
performed a similar function by policing an area of occupation and, in addition, 
assisting the missions in a spiritual conquest. Despite the obvious danger to an isolated 
military post in an essentially foreign land, the protection provided by the province's 
presidios was minimal but sufficient to discourage Indian assault. I 
Initially the soldiers built a palisade structure of poles set close together in a 
trench, tied with willows and reeds, and plastered with mud. The buildings' flat roofs 
were covered with leaves, branches and sod. Eventually the garrison troopers built a 
quadrangle of adobe buildings grouped around a parade ground and surrounded by a 
defensive wall which also served as the back wall of the presidio buildings. In case of 
attack the defending troopers climbed on the building roofs and fired over the wall. To 
contend with a greater threat, the commanders located the presidios between two 
thousand and four thousand feet from the shoreline to be out of cannon range from 
enemy ships. 2 
The 1772 royal regulations gave few instructions regarding presidio 
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construction. The ordinances stipulated outer walls built of adobe with small bastions at 
two of the corners. The interior contained the chapel, guardhouse, barracks, and 
residences for the commandant, officers, and chaplain. 3 In 1781 Ger6nino de la Rocha, 
the military engineer of the commandant general of the interior provinces, 
supplemented these guidelines with additional requirements. Adobe bricks were to be 
mixed with wood scraps and rock and allowed to dry completely before use. 
Foundations were to consist of rock and rubble and perimeter walls as well as the walls 
of the commandant's headquarters and the chapel were to be almost three feet thick. 
The barracks height was set at almost fourteen feet with the exterior wall extending 
four and one half feet above the roof top to form a parapet. Difficulties in obtaining 
building materials, shortages of manpower, and local climate conditions often caused 
these regulations to be largely ignored. 4 
Monterey Presidio founded in June, 1770, served as the capital of the California 
province. Don Miguel Costans6 of the Royal Corps of Engineers selected the site and 
traced out lines for the buildings and defense works. He supervised construction of two 
storehouses for temporary living quarters for the officers and missionaries. Another 
storehouse functioned as a powder magazine. A palisade enclosed the buildings which 
provided a rudimentary defense. Missionaries dedicated one building as a church, but 
the mission was moved the following year to separate the neophytes from the soldiers. 5 
In November, 1773, Captain Pedro Pages, commandant of the Monterey 
Presidio, sent a report on California and the development of his presidio to Viceroy 
Bucareli. According to Pages the fort's dimension was about 140 feet square. A small 
adobe church with a bell tower was located along the south wall. Attached to the 
church was a single room dwelling for the visiting fathers. The soldiers built six small 
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rooms along the east wall of the presidio for the mail couriers, blacksmith, carpenter, 
muleteers, servants, and Indians who slept at the presidio. The west wall contained two 
barracks and the pharmacy and in the north wing there were two storehouses, a prison, 
a guardhouse, the presidio store, and the commandant's quarters. At the four comers of 
the presidio were ravelins each armed with two bronze cannon.6 
The church and the buildings along the north wing employed adobe wall 
construction with stone foundations. Wooden beams supported flat roofs which were 
covered with cane and lime. The rooms located along the east and west wings used pine 
poles and lime plaster for the walls and earth topped roofs. The doors to the presidio 
dwellings were pine, redwood, and cypress. Pages reported that beams had already 
been cut so that the construction of the east and west wings would be similar to the 
other buildings. Three sides of the outer wall were built of pine and wood logs and the 
front wall consisted of adobe blocks on a stone foundation. Due to wood rot caused by 
the humid climate Pages planned to replace the pine log walls with stone and adobe. 
Beyond the presidio walls were hogstyes, two corrals for cows and mules, a powder 
magazine, a guardhouse, wheat fields, and a vegetable garden protected by a small 
blockhouse. 7 
In 1777 California Governor Neve, who had replaced Pages, reported that 
despite his predecessor's efforts the condition of the California presidios was totally 
inadequate for defense, even against Indians. Monterey's fortification had deteriorated 
to such an extent that it was entirely open to assault, the troops being the only means of 
protection. 8 
Neve immediately began to strengthen the perimeter and in July, 1778, he 
reported to Commandant General Croix that new stone walls and bastions were 
completed. The walls were 369 feet long on each side, eleven feet high and almost four 
feet thick. They enclosed ten adobe houses, each with a frontage of nineteen feet and a 
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depth of twenty-two feet. A guardroom and barracks were sixteen by ninety-six feet 
and built of double walls. These structures replaced the initial construction of Pages. 9 
In September, 1791, a Spanish scientific expedition led by Alessandro 
Malaspina visited Monterey and illustrators made sketches of the presidio. They reveal 
substantial walls of stone or adobe and roofs of both cane and tile. Blockhouses occupy 
the comer angles of the perimeter fence. Apparently some improvements were still in 
progress, as a building is drawn while under construction.IO 
The following year Captain George Vancouver visited the California presidios 
and paid particular attention to their location and defenses. II He found the Monterey 
fort poorly situated three-quarters of a mile from the port anchorage near low swampy 
ground and distant from drinking water. In front of the presidio entrance the troops had 
mounted 4 nine and 3 three-pounder cannon but the guns were without breastworks or 
weather protection. Additionally there were four dismounted nine-pounders that, 
together with the mounted guns, were intended for a battery to be built on a hill that 
commanded the anchorage. While the guns could control the anchorage they were 
useless after a landing by enemy forces had taken place. The hills behind the cannon 
could easily be taken and the battery forced to surrender. Vancouver found such a 
defensive scheme to be of limited usefulness and believed that Monterey could only be 
defended with "an extensive line of works." 12 
Regarding the interior dwellings Vancouver noted that the commandant's house 
had five or six "spacious" rooms with boarded floors but no glass in the window 
openings. All the buildings were located along the walls on the inside of the enclosure, 
the chapel standing opposite the main entrance. Small blockhouses stood at each of the 
four comers to protect the perimeter. Overall the presidio, when seen at a distance, 
reminded Vancouver of a prison. 13 
The presidio at Monterey deteriorated steadily during the last twenty years of 
the Spanish period in California. In 1800 Commandant Raimundo Carrillo reported 
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that all the structures were in bad condition after being rebuilt on insufficient 
foundations following a fire. A storm had destroyed the main gate and new rooms were 
needed at the barracks and jail. The presidio commandant's house had been demolished 
due to the death of the previous commander by disease. Several walls throughout the 
presidio were cracked.14 
Carrillo's report recorded the changes that had taken place at the fort over the 
years. Each side of the square was 330 feet long and the four walls were of adobe and 
stone. The north side contained the main entrance, guard house, and storage 
warehouses. Opposite the main gate were the chapel and nine houses. The governor's 
house and dwellings of other officers stood along the west wall. Located at the east 
wing were nine soldier's houses and the blacksmith's shop.15 
In 1815 a visitor to the California coast reported that Monterey was located on a 
"beautiful and extensive" plain and consisted of fifty houses built in a square and 
surrounded by a stone wall. The disposition of the structures are the same as in 
Carrillo's report and 2 six-pounder guns are located in the center of the plaza. Three 
years later an attack by revolutionary privateer Hippolyte Bourchard destroyed much of 
the presidio but the rebuilt fort was essentially unchanged from Carrillo's description, 
except the defense wall was now separated from the rear of the buildings.16 
Next in signifigance to the California capital at Monterey was the San Francisco 
presidio located on a strategically important bay. Despite its vital position, this presidio 
constantly needed repairs due to ravages of weather, inadequate supply, or poor 
worksmanship. Founded in September, 1777, the first garrison built palisade structures 
with flat roofs around a square of ninety-two yards. The initial dwellings were a 
cornmandant's house, chapel, warehouse, and apartments for the soldiers.l7 The 
soldiers constructed adobe walls but heavy rains in the winter of 1778-1779 caused 
them to collapse. They were replaced on three sides by walls of turf plastered with mud 
but the fourth barrier consisted solely of abatis. IS 
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A spring 1792 report from presidio commandant Hermenegildo Sal to the 
governor indicated the difficulties of maintaining the facility. Most buildings, especially 
the chapel, could collapse at any time. None of the fort's dwellings were original 
structures, as each year some houses fell and were replaced with new dwellings built 
with poor materials. Sal described walls that were out-of-plumb and wider at the top 
than the bottom, roofs of grass and reeds, poor adobe and a shortage of timber. The 
comtnandant blamed the poor construction on a lack of intelligent workmen and poor 
supervision. 19 
George Vancouver reported on the San Francisco presidio during his 1792 
California visit. He found the fort located in a "spacious verdant plain" occupied by 
flocks of sheep and cattle and two gardens. Three of the perimeter walls were built of 
sod and the fourth was "very indifferently fenced in by a few bushes here and there, 
fastened to stakes in the ground." Inside these weak barriers the Spanish fabricated 
thatched roof houses that extended uniformly into the square, which was empty. 
Opposite the main entrance was the church and the commandant's house, which 
consisted of two rooms and a closet. All houses had dirt floors, open windows, and 
very little furniture. According to Vancouver, these houses "in the winter, or rainy 
seasons, must at the best be very uncomfortable dwellings." This presidio offered 
protection to San Francisco bay solely with a brass three-pounder cannon mounted on a 
rotten carriage and another lashed to a log. 20 
Over a decade later Doctor Georg Von I..angsdorff accompanied a Russian visit 
to the settlement and wrote that it resembled a German farm. The commandant's house 
was depicted as "small and mean" and still poorly furnished, although half the floor 
was now covered with straw matting. The basic layout of the presidio was the same, as 
Langsdorff found low, one-story buildings surrounding a quadrangular plaza.21 
As at Monterey, the final years of the Spanish period saw the constant 
deterioration of the San Francisco bay area fort caused by the elements. In 1794 
40 
Commandant Sal, with Governor Borica's consent, proposed moving the location of the 
presidio but the viceroy refused for financial reasons. Drifting sand had covered the 
powder magazine and gales and a hurricane damaged walls and roofs. According to 
Sal, the garrison was so small and busy with duties that repairs could not be made, and 
he continued to ask for workmen and funds for restoration.22 
Other commandants fared no better than Sal in maintaining the presidio. By 
1808 a barracks had only half a roof and was not secure for convicts. Two years later 
earthquakes cracked house walls and in 1810 storms had reduced the granary and some 
houses to a barely useable state, and completely destroyed the chapel and some 
barracks. 23 
The first California presidio was founded at San Diego in June, 1769. At the 
outset this establishment consisted of a fortified camp on the beach protected by earth 
parapets and two cannon. The camp was soon moved to a hill overlooking the bay 
where the Spanish built a stockade presidio similar to the early construction at 
Monterey and San Francisco. The mission at San Diego shared the same grounds as the 
presidio until the religious facility was moved in August, 1774, and the mission 
buildings turned over to the military. 24 
In 1773 the compound consisted of a church, missionary dwellings, a hut for 
the soldier's barracks, and a warehouse. The troopers used logs and adobe for the 
structures with tule for the roofs. Log perimeter walls and two bronze cannon provided 
defense against attack. A new church foundation was being built. 25 
Few descriptions of the San Diego presidio construction and condition are 
available. In 1782 Captain Pedro Pages noted that the presidio was in good condition 
with the garrison erecting a chapel and an adobe defense wall. A decade later George 
Vancouver wrote that San Diego was irregularly built on uneven ground in barren 
country. The following year Governor Borica reported to the viceroy that three sides of 
the outer walls were in ruins due to poor quality timber but that the warehouse, 
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officer's quarters and church were all in good condition. In 1796 the soldiers dedicated 
new houses to accommodate reinforcements sent into the province. Despite the absence 
of the harsh weather that ravaged the more norther! y presidios in 1817 Governor Pablo 
Vicente de Sola found the buildings in such poor shape that he recommended moving 
the entire presidio but this was not undertaken.26 
The Spanish established the Santa Barbara presidio in April, 1782, to protect the 
missions along the Santa Barbara channel from Indian attack. After establishing 
temporary lodging of brush and mud huts surrounded by a log palisade the soldiers 
began constructing permanent quarters around a piece of ground 320 feet square. These 
final dwellings used adobe bricks set on stone foundations, roofed with bright red tile 
and whitewashed. Heavy oaken doors protected the rear of the houses and windows 
were small openings that could be closed by shutters. Deer skins covered the dirt floors 
of the houses each of which was divided into two rooms with a kitchen often attached. 
The construction did not conform to any exact standard reflecting a lack of supervision 
by an architect or engineer. As a result, buildings were often of a different length or 
height.27 
The general plan of the fort was similar to the other three presidios. Opposite 
the entrance, which faced the ocean, was the chapel. Next to the chapel were the 
officers' quarters. The soldiers constructed storehouses to the right of the entrance, a 
guardhouse and sergeant's house to the left, and soldiers' dwellings on the other sides. 
A significant difference between Santa Barbara and the other provincial presidios was 
the location of an outer defense wall to surround the buildings and be unattached from 
them. This provided an open space of eighty feet between the buildings and the wall for 
a "killing zone" should an Indian assault breach the outer barrier. The outer wall itself 
was formidible, being built of adobe with a stone foundation, seven feet thick and 
twelve feet high. A corner bastion containing a small iron cannon added to the 
defenses. Two other iron cannon and a brass six-pounder faced the entrance in the 
square.28 
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The Santa Barbara presidio, benefitting from fair weather and an ample local 
supply of building material, presented a neat and solid appearance.29 George 
Vancouver wrote: "These buildings surpassed all the others I had seen, being 
something larger, and more uniform; and the apartments were infinitely more 
commodious, and were kept extremely neat and clean. "30 The British sea captain also 
commented that Santa Barbara appeared more "civili~" than California's other 
presidios. 31 
The Spanish authorities knew that these four forts could not stop an invasion by 
a European power. Designed only to prevent Indian attacks, Governor Felipe de Neve 
believed they were even inadequate to do that, as so many soldiers were at the missions 
on escort duty there were not enough troopers to man the ramparts. Vancouver reported 
that the Spanish defenses, instead of deterring a foreign attack, were so weak that they 
actually encouraged an invasion. Viceroy Conde de Revillagigedo notified the king in 
1792 that the California presidios were totally incapable of repelling a foreign attack. 
Although the troops could defeat the natives they were not trained or equipped to defeat 
Europeans. They were especially lacking in artillery to defend harbor entrances against 
ships of war.32 
The Spanish responded to international political pressure, the Nootka Sound 
incident and possibly even Vancouver's visit by attempting to strengthen the province's 
means of resistance. 33 The result was the construction of the second type of defensive 
structure employed in California, the castillo. Built on a level esplanade of wood 
planking, the castillos were fortified gun batteries in which cannon were emplaced 
behind embankments of dirt, adobe, or stone. Engineers located them on hilltops 
overlooking the harbors to prevent enemy ships from attacking the ports. 34 The 
emplacements were placed close to at least three of the presidios. 35 
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In July, 1793, California governor Jose Joaquin Arrillaga sent a report to the 
viceroy on the state of California defenses. He related that Monterey had eight cannon, 
San Francisco possessed two useless guns, Santa Barbara's garrison mustered no 
artillerymen for its two cannon, and San Diego's three guns were dismounted. Upon 
receipt of this news Viceroy Revillagigedo ordered castillos built at the presidios and 
artillery sent to Monterey. These guns arrived in time for Vancouver to observe in 
October, 1793, that eleven dismounted nine-pounder cannon were lying on the beach 
awaiting the completion of a barbette battery being built by soldiers and Indians. The 
following month the British sea captain inspected a completed gun battery at Monterey 
but was not impressed with its defensive possibilities. 36 
Revillagigedo' s successor as viceroy, the Marquis de Branciforte, continued the 
strengthening of California's defenses. In 1794 he sent royal engineer Miguel Costans6 
on an inspection tour of the province's fortifications. His account indicated the 
difficulties of adequately defending a territory so isolated from New Spain. Because of 
a lack of both human and material resources in the province to support the military in 
the event of an attack Costans6 felt that populating the territory with Spanish settlers 
was the best possible defense. If the presidios should be lost to foreign invasion they 
would be very difficult to recover because royal troops and supplies would have to 
cross barren deserts or face contrary sea winds to reach the province. Protecting the 
520 miles of coastline between San Diego and San Francisco with the 218 men then in 
the four presidios against foreign invasion was simply not possible. Nevertheless, he 
did recommend the establishment of batteries of 8 twelve-pound cannon with trained 
artillerymen at the entrances of Monterey, San Francisco, and San Diego harbors. 
·These would be protected by breastworks of dirt faced with adobe. 37 
In response to Costans6' s report Branciforte convened a special commission in 
July, 1795, to determine what specifically must be done to defend California. The 
members including Costans6, Royal Navy frigate captain Salvador Fidalgo, and 
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artillery brigadier Pablo Sanchez, offered several recommendations. First, only the 
three principal ports of San Francisco, Monterey, and San Diego should be fortified 
due to financial limitations. The castillo already begun at San Francisco should receive 
supplies and reinforcements in as much as there was no shot or powder for the guns 
and no one to man them. They urged construction of a battery at Monterey and San 
Diego where no adequate naval defenses currently existed. Eighty new troops, 
including eight to ten trained gunners were needed for the artillery. Even if these 
suggestions were implemented, the commission recognized that these defenses would 
only be successful against corsair attacks. An assault in force by a European power 
should be met with a retreat to the interior and guerrilla tactics. 38 
Two weeks after receiving the commission's report Branciforte took steps to 
bolster California's defenses against seaborne invasion. He ordered shot, guns and 
powder sent to the province to arm the fortifications recommended by the commission. 
Seventy-two men from the First Company of Catalonian Volunteers under the 
command of Lt. Colonel Pedro Alberni provided reinforcements to man the new 
castillos. From artillery companies came an additional sergeant, three corporals and 
fourteen soldiers to train the gunners for the batteries. Finally, a royal engineer, 
Captain Alberto de Cordoba, was transferred to California to organize and supervise 
the construction and maintenance of the province's defenses. Branciforte now reported 
to the king that this isolated territory could be defended against corsairs and other small 
scale attacks. 39 
Captain Cordoba spent three years trying to improve the harbor defenses at 
Monterey, San Francisco, and San Diego. The engineer extensively modified the log 
battery at the California capital, which he found useless for port defense. The battery of 
ten cannon could only hit a ship if it deliberately placed itself in front of the guns. The 
cannon themselves were of such short range they could not hit ships which could easily 
anchor in port and still be out of range. Under Cordoba's direction a V-shaped wall 
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with sixty foot wings was built to overlook the main anchorage. The wings formed a 
massive platform of adobe bricks laid by an expert mason. A crenelated protective wall 
could mount ten to twelve cannon of various calibre. A rough cobblestone esplanade 
stretched across the open end of the V -shape and a powder magazine occupied the area 
near the apex. Finally, the Spanish built an adobe barracks for the gunners.40 
C6rdoba established two batteries to protect San Francisco bay. The garrison 
completed a fortification known as the Castillo de San Joaquin in 1794 at Fort Point to 
guard the entrance to the port. Built in a horseshoe shape with walls of adobe and 
bricks, San Joaquin mounted thirteen guns ranging from half-culverins to twenty-four-
pounders. C6rdoba found the cannon poorly placed and none of them capable of firing 
completely across the mouth of the entrance to the bay. Gun discharges caused the 
battery walls to shake and shot was lacking for the weapons which were too small and 
in poor condition. Only ten men had been assigned to the castillo, four of which had no 
knowledge of artillery. Obviously the engineer found San Joaquin useless to repel even 
a minor assault. 41 
C6rdoba improved the firepower and protection of the castillo by properly 
emplacing the cannon and repairing the walls. He also established a second castillo at 
Yerba Buena, a location east of the presidio to command the eastern part of the channel 
leading into San Francisco bay. Less elaborate than San Joaquin, this castillo consisted 
of brushwork fascines with eight embrasures and 5 eight-pound guns. Without a 
permanent garrison, Yerba Buena was visited daily by a sentry.42 
In 1796 C6rdoba inspected the harbor defenses at San Diego and found its best 
advantage as being that an enemy would be ignorant of its weaknesses. Originally a 
wooden platform that mounted four guns, the royal engineer eventually constructed an 
adobe and brick castillo that mounted eight guns at Point Guijarros, at the entrance to 
San Diego bay.43 
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Captain C6rdoba was aware that these small naval batteries were not the answer 
to ensuring California's safety from attack. A report to Viceroy Branciforte indicated 
that numerous unprotected anchorages existed along the California coast which was 
guarded by a total presidia! force of only three hundred soldiers. Because only 
excessive expenditures could provide the fortifications necessary for adequate defense 
he recommended increasing the provincial cavalry complement as a mobile response 
force to a landing. He also suggested that several warships constantly patrol the coast 
thereby providing the firepower to repel a naval invasion. 44 
Despite the royal engineer's best efforts the bulwarks he built did not present a 
very formidible appearance to foreign vessels. An American visitor to the California 
coast, trader William Shaler, wrote in 1804 that the guns of Castillo de San Joaqufn 
"afford only the show of defense; and the place could make no resistance against the 
smallest military force ... " Calling the Monterey battery "altogether inadequate" and the 
San Diego defenses as not meriting "the least consideration as a fortification" Shaler 
believed that the conquest of the province could be accomplished easily by a minor 
military force. Two years later Langsdorf£ noted the inadequacy of the San Joaquin 
naval defenses in protecting San Francisco bay. 45 
The castillos during the final years of the Spanish era fought the same battles 
with deterioration that had plagued the presidio complexes. At San Francisco storms in 
1804 blew down the walls at Yerba Buena and San Joaquin's barricades were improved 
the following year. In 1816 San Joaquin was rebuilt and at the end of the Spanish 
period boasted twenty guns. In 1817 California governor Vicente de Sola inspected the 
province's defenses and reported that the artillerymen at the castillos were few, 
· disabled, and unskillful and the cannon were defective and short on ammunition. As a 
result he ordered a general reconstruction of the Monterey battery including the 
creation of a new three gun battery. This rebuilding included a resupply of shot and 
powder and was motivated by the threat of attack by South American revolutionaries. 
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When such an attack did take place, in 1818 by a small force led by privateer Hippolyte 
Bourchard, the Monterey castillo was captured and all the guns destroyed. 46 
Despite the best efforts of the Spanish authorities California's presidios and 
castillos were never formidable defenses. Inadequate supply and manpower, unskilled 
workmanship, and occasional bad weather combined to keep the fortifications in almost 
constant state of disrepair. Without the aid of intimidating bastions for protection 
California's small military contingent was fortunate in not being seriously challenged 
for control of the province. The soldier's best defenses were not adobe walls or iron 
cannon but the disuinity and tractibility of the natives and the disinterest of foreign 
powers. In many ways the presidios and castillos were symbolic of the entire Spanish 
effort in California. Small and undermanned they served primarily to establish a 
presence in New Spain's last frontier that, although weak, proved to be adequate in 
maintaining royal control. 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV 
1. Beiharz, 80. 
2. RichardS. Whitehead, "Alta California's Four Fortresses," Southern 
California Quanerly 65 (Spring 1983): 69-79. 
3. Brinckerhoff and Faulk, Lancers, 63. 
4. Presidia! measurements were often given in varas. One Spanish vara 
equalled 33.3 inches. Max L. Moorehead, The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish 
Borderlands, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), 174-75. 
48 
5. Janet Fireman, The Spanish Royal Corps of Engineers in the Western 
Borderlands, 1764-1815 (Glendale: Arthur Clark Co., 1977), 105; Bancroft, 18:170, 
177. 
6. Maynard Geiger, trans. and ed., "A Description of California's Principal 
Presidio, Monterey, in 1773," Southern California Quarterly 49 (1967): 328-33. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Beilharz, 80; Bancroft, 18:331. 
9. Whitehead, 89. 
10. Cutter, 18. 
11. Some of the information given by Vancouver's report is inaccurate. He 
states that the dimensions of the presidio are three hundred yards by two hundred fifty 
yards which is much too large. He also states that the fort had not undergone any 
alteration since its founding, obviously ignorant of the improvements made by Neve. 
Vancouver, 2:43; Bancroft, 18:681. 
12. Vancouver, 2:44-45. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Bancroft, 19: 143; Bancroft, 18:681. 
15. Bancroft, 18: 681. 
16. Peter Corney, Early Voyages in the North Pacific, 1813-1818 (Fairfield, 
Wa.: Ye Galleon Press, 1965), 129; Whitehead, 83. 
49 
17. Pal6u, 4: 124; Bancroft, 18:289. 
18. Beilharz, 81. 
19. Whitehead, 71; Bancroft, 18:695. 
20. Vancouver, 2:6-9. 
21. Langsdorff, 40-41. 
22. Bancroft, 18:696-97. 
23. Bancroft, 19:129. 
24. Zoeth S. Eldredge, The March of Portola and the Discovery of the Bay of 
San Francisco (San Francisco: The California Promotion Committee, 1909), 28; 
Bancroft, 18:230. 
25. Pal6u, 3:215. 
26. Herbert Priestley, ed., "The Colorado River Campaign, 1781-1782; Diary 
of Pedro Fages," Publications of the Academy of Pacific Coast History 3 (May 1913): 
99; Vancouver, 2:495; Bancroft, 18:651; Bancroft, 19:343. 
27. Walter A. Hawley, The Early Days of Santa Barbara, California,· From 
the First Discoveries by Europeans to December 1846 (Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara 
Heritage, 1987), 49-51. 
28. Ibid. 
29. One of the soldier's family quarters survived two hundred years and is now 
renovated. Whitehead, 89. 
30. Vancouver, 2:493. 
31. Ibid., 2:451. 
32. Beilharz, 82-83; Vancouver, 2:501; Fireman, 113. 
33. Spain and Great Britain had almost gone to war over the seizure of four 
British trading vessels in 1789 by the Spanish at Nootka Sound, an inlet claimed by 
Spain on the west coast of Vancouver Island. Because of military weakness Spain 
yielded to British demands that each nation was to be free to trade and establish 
settlements on unoccupied land. Bannon, 225; Cook, 146-99. 
50 
34. Whitehead, 70. 
35. There is some question whether a castillo was built at Santa Barbara during 
the Spanish period. Although one may have been built in 1794 Santa Barbara historian 
Richard Whitehead argues that a castillo was not constructed there until1830. Diane 
Spencer-Hancock and William E. Pritchard, "El Castillo de Monterey: Frontline of 
Defense," California History 63 (Summer 1984): 240. 
36. Bancroft, 18:515; Vancouver, 2:500. 
37. Servin, 223-29; Fireman, 115. 
38. Fireman, 118-120. 
39. Ibid., 121-23. 
40. Bancroft, 18:682; Spencer-Hancock and Pritchard, 223; Fireman, 126. 
41. Fireman, 124; Bancroft, 18:699-701. 
42. Bancroft, 18:702. 
43. Fireman, 127; Bancroft, 18:652. 
44. Fireman, 126. 
45. Shaler, 68-77; Langsdorff, 77. 
46. Bancroft, 19:127, 214, 371, 380; Spencer-Hancock and 
Pritchard, 234-40. 
CHAPTER V 
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE 
Besides the usual dangers of frontier service, the isolated nature of the 
California province caused additional hardships for the presidia! forces stationed there. 
Until mission agriculture and presidia! ranching became well established food was in 
short supply. Revolutionary activity in Mexico completely disrupted the supply system 
so that the soldiers received no pay during the last decade of Spanish rule. The small 
pueblos did not offer many opportunities for diversion from military life. Schools 
existed infrequently at the towns or presidios and only one physician served the entire 
province. 
However, frontier service offered some advantages, especially in California. 
Low prices offset the trooper's low pay, expecially for livestock which became 
abundant in the province. California goods went directly from the supply ships to the 
presidio's warehouse, thereby eliminating the middleman's price gouging that was too 
common in other frontier territories. The difficulty of reinforcing the isolated province 
with new recruits encouraged promotion from within the presidio's complements. 
Military justice was strict but fair and the possibility of land acquisition at retirement 
made a decent post-military life attainable. 
Soldiers serving in California received their pay under three different sets of 
regulations. Initially, the Reglamento de Presidios, dictated annual army pay (in pesos) 
as shown in Table 1.1 
TABLE I 














However from this salary the soldier supplied his horse, arms, and uniform, but 
I 
these were obtained at cost. Also, twenty to twenty-five pesos annually were deducted 
from the trooper's pay to accumulate a one hundred peso trust fund for his family's 
welfare on retirement. Finally, a yearly ten peso deduction created a presidio common 
fund for the payment of "general expenses." The soldier received very little of his 
compensation in coin as most of his pay was kept on account in the presidio 
commissary. These accounts were used as credit to supply his and his family's needs 
and also to withhold salary for damages, fmes, and penalties against the state. 2 
In 1773 revised statutes solely concerning California went into effect. These 
regulations, inspired by California mission president Junlpero Serra, tried to reduce 
government expense in supplying the remote province by increasing the troopers' pay 
but placing a 150 per cent surcharge on all stocks shipped there. Furthermore, soldiers 
were not to be paid in cash but entirely in goods. 3 
The new yearly pay scale is shown in Table 2.4 
TABLE II 










Despite the pay increase the surcharge greatly reduced buying power. As a 
result desertion increased and troopers evaded California duty. To remedy the problem 
Governor Felipe de Neve promulgated a new regulation that became law in 1781 and 
would remain in effect throughout the Spainish period. It reduced soldiers' pay and 
eliminated the surcharge; one quarter of the salary was to be paid in coin. The net 
result was a considerable increase in buying power. The new pay scale in Table 3 
illustrated the wage decrease. 5 
TABLE III 











The relative worth of the presidia!' s salary can be seen by comparing it to the 
regular Spanish infantry unit, the Catalonian Volunteers, which served in California. 
Their salary is shown in Table 4. 6 
TABLE IV 













However, presidiallancers incurred the added expense of maintaining horses 
and saddlery. To equip themselves for combat, the troopers paid the prices shown in 
Table 5.7 
TABLEV 





Saddle 12-16 p 
Sword 4 p 4 reales 
Gun 4 p 4 reales 
Gunpowder 1 p per pound 
Lance 7 reales 
Spurs 1 p 
Stirrups 1p 
Bridle 1p 
Gun case 1 p 4 reales 
Cuera 10-20 p 
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Governor Pedro Pages in 1788 fixed the prices on many provisions which gives 
a further indication of a soldier's buying power. Cows and work oxen cost five pesos 
apiece and bulls four pesos. A trained mule was worth twenty pesos. One real 
purchased over three pounds of jerked beef or ten pounds of fresh beef. A dozen eggs, 
two chickens, or four rabbits cost two reales apiece. To buy a fanega (1.6 bushels) of 
wheat required two pesos and afanega of com one peso. Luxuries were available for a 
price. Chocolate was valued at between three and five reales a pound. Sugar cost two 
reales a pound and six reales purchased a pint of brandy. An expensive luxury item, 
silk stockings, cost over four pesos. 8 
The commissary accounts were often disorganized and there was little incentive 
for the soldiers to save their wages. To settle a deceased soldier's account authorities 
often sought descendants to inherit funds. That failing, the money went to clerics for 
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masses for the trooper's soul and small sums were simply kept by the government. As a 
result military personnel used all their pay rather than have it lost in muddled records 
or returned to the bureaucracy. 9 
There were also complaints concerning the salary amount. In 1799 the 
province's officers requested an annual increase of 150 pesos because the current sum 
was inadequate to feed and clothe an officer's family. They stated that their children 
were barefoot and in rags while wives took in sewing and washing. There is no 
outcome recorded for this request.lO 
During the last decade of Spanish rule revolutionary activity seriously disrupted 
the regular government supply ships to California and the military received no pay at 
all. Tobacco was often substituted for wages and the missions became the primary 
source of presidia! supply for food, cloth, and produce. In 1816 a Russian visitor 
recorded that the troopers had not received pay for seven years and had no decent 
clothing or European goods. Occasionally Russian ships and Yankee traders could 
furnish supplies, but not pay, to the presidios.ll 
Besides salary, a basic army ration was given to each soldier. Married men 
received extra food according to the family size, with the ration's amount and 
consistence determined by availability. During the early years of California occupation 
before mission or presidio agriculture was well established food was often scarce. In 
1772 Governor Fages and thirteen men spent three months hunting bears to supply the 
Monterey presidio with meat. The presidio also had some vegetables and milk and 
relied on the natives to augment their meagre stocks. Two years later a soldier at the 
San Diego presidio received a weekly ration of one a/mud (approximately 13.6 pounds) 
of com, one-half an a/mud of beans, one-eighth an a/mud of chile and one-quarter an 
a/mud of jerked beef. Married troopers acquired two additional a/muds of com and a 
larger portion of beef. Each child was alloted one-half almud of com. Despite 
occasional amounts of garbanzos, rice, lentils, brown sugar loaves and chocolate the 
bulk of the ration was an inadequate amount of com and beans.l2 
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By 1777 the situation slightly improved and the San Diego military personnel 
received an extra one-half almud of com weekly but were expected to shoot wildfowl 
as a dietary supplement. The same year the San Francisco garrison, after replenishment 
by supply vessels, ate com, beans, lentils, chick peas, rice, lard, brown sugar, chili 
and biscuit. Fresh meat, dried fish, and hardtack soon became regular features of the 
presidial ration.l3 
The establishment of presidio livestock ranches and the growth of mission 
agriculture greatly improved the food situation. Visitors to the military establishments 
commented on the abundance and variety of the province's crops created by good soil 
and climate. In 1786 French explorer Jean La Perouse commented that "European 
cultivators can form no conception of so abundant a fertility" as his ship was supplied 
with com, beans, peas, poultry, milk, cattle, and garden stuffs.l4 Five years later 
Alessandro Malaspina found grapes, pears, peaches, and plums available at certain 
missions. In 1792 George Vancouver found the Monterey presidio garden growing 
peas, lettuce, cabbage, and beans. Monterey also possessed well-stocked poultry pens. 
The San Francisco garrison supplied him with oxen, sheep, and some "excellent" 
vegetables. At nearby Mission Santa Clara the British officer found gardens containing 
peaches, apricots, apples, pears, figs, grapes, and he dined on beef, mutton, fish, fowl, 
vegetables, tea, and chocolate. Vancouver also commented on the abundant harvests. IS 
In 1806 Russian Nikolai Rezanov was supplied at San Francisco with oxen, sheep, 
onions, garlic, chocolate, lettuce, cabbage, and several other kinds of vegetables. The 
following decade a fellow Russian, naval lieutenant Otto von Kotzebue, received a fat 
ox, two sheep, cabbage, gourds, and a great quantity of fruit that included watermelon 
and apples.16 These reports and mission statistics listing 140,000 cattle, 190,000 sheep 
and an average harvest of 113,625 bushels of wheat, barley, corn, beans, and peas in 
1820 indicate that the inhabitants of California probably ate well.l7 
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In return for their salary and ration soldiers performed a variety of duties. At 
the presidio troopers drew sentry detail three hours a night. Lancers also built the 
presidios, their own quarters, and the castillos that protected them. Serving as 
vaqueros, shepherds, and butchers, the enlisted men managed the livestock herds at the 
presidio ranches. They also carried the mail and escorted officials traveling the Camino 
Real. Expeditions to arrest neophyte runaways, locate possible mission sites, gather 
intelligence about inland natives or punish recalcitrant Indian villages provided 
excitement to an otherwise dull routine. IS 
Soldiers generally disliked guard duty at the missions due to the monotonous 
tasks performed and the padres' strict discipline. A corporal and four or five soldiers 
lived at each religious establishment to enforce good order and prevent disturbances. A 
soldier stood guard with a sword during daytime and a musket at the four night 
watches. Lancers escorted the priests whenever they left the compound. Married 
soldiers and their families shared small houses provided for their use but all troopers, 
married or single, slept in the guardhouse to prevent the rape of native women. The 
padres provided extra pay to corporals serving as the mission mayordomo and also 
furnished the rations to the mission guard.19 
Military personnel also performed tasks at civilian pueblos. A small guard was 
established at the towns of Los Angeles and San Jose with the corporal acting as 
comisionado, a position with considerable power. Reporting directly to the 
commandant of the local presidio, the comisionado observed the actions of the mayor 
and councilmen, ensured the settlers performed their duties, enforced order, justice, 
and morality, and monitored the use of natives as laborers.20 
A muster list from the San Diego presidio in 1784 illustrates the number of 
activities executed by the troopers. The presidio reserve consisted of a lieutenant, 
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ensign, sergeant, and twelve lancers. A corporal and five soldiers stood guard duty. 
Three soldiers protected the horses and cattle. Guard details of six soldiers each served 
three local missions. Three men guarded Los Angeles and two men performed special 
duty in San Francisco. Two men were assigned to the governor and three men 
transported supplies with the mule train. 21 
Non-military tasks also occupied the soldiers • time. Men cut wood and procured 
items for their families. Some worked at occupations necessary for the military 
community, such as shoemaker or tailor. Literate troopers taught school. Although 
some civilians were employed as blacksmiths, carpenters, mechanics, and muleteers, a 
labor scarcity forced the lancers to do extra work necessary for the presidio 
community's survival. In 1791 a Spanish naval visitor wrote that "It would be very 
lengthy to express in detail all the jobs to which these soldiers . . . lend themselves." 
The report added that the only leisure time available was standing guard because non-
duty time was spent in domestic work. 22 
Nevertheless, some diversions relieved the daily routine. Bullfights were 
popular and often staged on special occasions. During Malaspina's visit a daily 
bullfight in the center of the presidio provided recreation and an alternative to alcohol. 
The Russians in the Rezanov party also witnessed the sport and troopers killed four 
bulls during Governor Vicente de Sola's inaugural celebration in 1815.23 Other violent 
spectacles included bull and bear fights and cockfighting that involved knives attached 
to the bird' s legs. 24 
Special occasions prompted another common pastime of dancing which involved 
the presidio ladies. Following dinner and fireworks the officers of Vancouver's ships 
· joined in a dance with Spanish officers and ladies. Accompanied by soldiers playing 
violins and guitars, Rezanov's officers taught the Californians English country dances 
which became very popular in the province. The dance at Governor Sola's inauguration 
lasted until dawn and featured the Monterey women dressed in their finest gowns. 25 
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Whether on or off-duty, California's soldiers were subject to frontier military 
law. Discipline tended to be strict and, according to regulations, was enforced by the 
presidio commandant. Penalties included pay forfeiture, hard labor in a chain gang, 
imprisonment and increased terms of service. Soldiers were also subject to physical 
punishments like running a gauntlet of men armed with ramrods, whipping, parading in 
the hot sun wearing several cueras, and the ultimate penalty of death. 26 
Nevertheless officers could not inflict discipline capriciously. The commandant 
was not allowed to increase penalties and even minor offenses resulted in an official 
investigation and trial with the accused often choosing his own defense representative. 
In 1778 a dispute between two soldiers involving drawn guns led to a formal trial with 
thirty-two pages of testimony, and after five months, a decision was rendered. In 1818 
a soldier stood trial for insulting his sergeant. The trooper's choice for the role of 
defense attorney traveled from San Diego to Monterey to participate in the hearing.27 
More serious cases also carefully followed legal procedure. In 1773 near 
Mission San Diego some lancers were charged with attacking two Indian girls and 
killing one. The case took over five years to resolve and produced forty-two documents 
covering ninety-three pages of manuscript. All statements of the accused and witnesses 
were recorded before the legal advisor to the viceroy finally declared a judgement. In 
1800, at the trial of a young soldier at the Santa Barbara presidio accused of bestiality 
with a mule, an ensign served as prosecutor, a cadet became clerk and a retired 
sergeant was defense counsel. The trooper's death sentence, given by the viceroy, was 
carried out by the firing squad with the entire presidio present. 28 
As that case illustrated, a guilty verdict often meant a stiff sentence. In 1799 for 
receiving stolen goods a soldier was sentenced to five years service on the royal 
vessels. The following year two lancers began serving a year's labor on the presidio for 
breaking open a trunk. In 1818 fifty lashes were meted out for the theft of two pesos. 
In 1811 four soldiers were imprisoned at San Diego for plotting a presidio takeover as 
part of the Mexican revolution. Three of the troopers died in captivity and the fourth 
was not freed until the revolution's success in 1821, having served a decade in 
chains.29 
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Good conduct or an officer's rank often mitigated the sentence. For example a 
good service record might lead to a reduction of punishment. In 1777 the commandant 
released a soldier at Monterey with a warning after being convicted of an illicit 
friendship with a native. In 1784 the Monterey commandant, arrested for gambling, 
insubordination, and smuggling, was relieved and sent to another frontier post. A fight 
between two lieutenants, nearly causing bloodshed, was resolved with only a 
reprimand. 30 
On the other hand a good service record often meant promotion. According to 
regulations the California governor would propose candidates for post commandant 
vacancies to the commandant of the interior provinces. All other promotions were 
executed locally with the presidio lieutenant promoting troopers to sergeant and 
corporal with the governor's approval. The statutes also dictated that the nominees 
should be distinguished by bravery and good conduct. 31 
Historian Herbert Bancroft lists 115 presidial soldiers who served in California 
between 1769-1800. Of these, thirty-seven advanced to corporal or sergeant, promotion 
occurring after at least one term of ten years service. Educated troopers moved through 
the ranks more quickly as literacy was a requirement to earn a corporal's status. 
Occasionally lancers also received battlefield promotions. 32 
There were other paths to higher rank. Appointed by the viceroy, a few cadets 
served in the presidio companies. They lived with the officers but did duty in the ranks. 
Required to live and dress as gentlemen, they were promoted directly to ensign. 
Soldados distinguidos were mustered in as enlisted personnel but by producing evidence 
of noble birth they were exempt from menial tasks and given the title don. A 
commisioned officer's son could claim this privilege. Before receiving an ensign's 
commission a so/dado distinguido would have to serve as corporal and sergeant. 33 
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The fmal reward for honorable duty was retirement. Soldiers were required to 
serve a minimum of eighteen years to retire as an invalid on a half-pay pension. 
Corporals and privates with thirty years in the king's army received upon retirement the 
honorary rank of ensign and could wear the uniform of the new grade. A forty year 
veteran earned honorary lieutenant status. 34 
Despite official separation from active duty many invalids remained at the 
presidios, performing some military tasks. Literate retirees occasionally became school 
teachers, and often invalids and soldiers eligible for discharge remained on active 
service due to a shortage of recruits. In 1795 seventy troopers in the four presidios 
were entitled to retirement but there were no replacements available. Pensioners were 
also called back to serve as volunteers or artillery militia for presidio defense. 35 In less 
urgent times the invalids living near the presidios raised chickens, cows, and vegetables 
to supplement their income. 36 
Most soldiers retired to the pueblos of San Jose or Los Angeles and with their 
families consititued the majority of the civilian population. They received grants of land 
to support themselves and the presidio food stocks as well. The pueblo invalids served 
as a provincial militia and instructed the next generation in military obedience. Some 
retirees gained civil office as mayors, justices, or teachers. The local presidio 
commandants appointed all the pueblo officials and the office holders received a 
measure of respect and honor. 37 
A few veterans received land grants to establish livestock ranches. The 
authorities seldom refused land requests by soldiers who had served two or three 
enlistment terms honorably. The grantees were required to live in the pueblos but this 
rule was often ignored. Governor Pedro Fages in 1784 gave the first land permits to 
three San Diego presidio soldiers and by 1820 thirty-eight ranches existed in the 
62 
province, although this number included some neophyte farms. 38 Despite the small 
number they were large in size. Juan Jose Dominguez received 74,000 acres in the Los 
Angeles vicinity and authorities granted Manuel Nieto and Jose Maria Verdugo each 
over 30,000 acres. Luis Peralta, a corporal at the San Francisco presidio, acquired land 
that is now Oakland, Alameda, and Berkeley. Because of their low social background 
most veterans remained on their grants because of the enhanced status and social 
mobility that land ownership bestowed. 39 
Service in California was typical of frontier duty throughout northern New 
Spain. Low pay, strict discipline, occasional danger, and a myriad of monotonous time-
consuming tasks marked presidia! life in any territory. Inadequate supply and 
manpower caused by California's isolation placed additional hardships on the troops 
stationed there. Emphasis upon posting married soldiers in the province created a force 
that needed to balance military duty and domestic concerns. That soldiers who were not 
generally considered military professionals could endure a closely regulated existence 
for long service terms in the borderlands is a credit to their perseverance and character. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DEFENDING THE FLAG 
In maintaining Spanish sovereignty over California the presidia! soldier fought 
three different categories of opponents. Indians living in the colony constantly 
threatened missions, settlements, and presidios throughout the Spanish period of 
occupation. Both mission neophytes and intractable natives challenged royal military 
power though ambushes, revolts, and pitched battles. A second challenge was Russian 
and American fur traders and trappers whose purpose was commercial gain and not 
conquest. Nevertheless, presidia! soldiers greeted violators of Spain Is mercantile 
restrictions and territorial integrity with arrest, confiscation, and even bullets. Finally 
Spain 1 s European rivals and revolutionary forces were potentially the most serious 
threat to the royal colony because these opponents possessed the military resources to 
invade and occupy California. This danger finally materialized in the last years of 
Spanish rule with an assault by South American insurgents upon the California capital 
at Monterey in the only European style battle to be fought by presidia! troopers. 
Despite inadequate training, supply difficulties, and insufficient numbers the California 
soldiery met these three challenges to ensure Spanish control over this isolated 
borderland province. 
To prevent foreign encroachment in California the Spanish government tried to 
create loyal, Catholic subjects out of the local Indians. This was necessary because 
New Spain could not provide enough citizens to send to the new province. The 
soldiers' primary duty was to protect the missions where the natives underwent 
conversion. The military's two fold mission was to prevent the Indians from 
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determining their numerical advantage over the small Hispanic population and to quell 
mission uprisings. I 
Foreign visitors to California certainly did not perceive the natives as a threat to 
Spanish occupation. George Vancouver in 1792 described them as a "compound of 
stupidity and innocence" with a "careless and indifferent" attitude toward their 
existence.2 He also observed that "they are certainly a race of the most miserable 
beings I ever saw, possessing the faculty of human reason," and believed that the 
mission fathers had no trouble in subjugating them.3 French maritime explorer Jean La 
Perouse echoed Vancouver's comments and described the mission neophytes as small 
and feeble with no desire for freedom. 4 When apprehended as mission runaways the 
Frenchman called the Indians "so destitute of courage, that they never oppose any 
resistance to the three or four soldiers, who so glaringly violate the rights of nations in 
their persons. "s Alessandro Malaspina simply called the California natives "degraded," 
"stupid," and "irrational beings. n6 
However, these are descriptions of those mission inmates who had lost their 
freedom and will to resist. Indians were quite capable of spirited resistance to the 
Spanish. An observation by royal engineer Miguel Costans6 of the Chumash tribes 
living along the Santa Barbara coast was made before the mission system was in place. 
Reporting that "These natives are well built and of a good disposition, very agile and 
alert, diligent and skillful," he stated that they handle their canoes with "indescribable 
agility and swiftness. "7 Their primary weapon, the bow and arrow, was made of wood 
and skillfully tipped with flint. La Perouse oberved that "These Indians are very adroit 
in the uses of the bow, and killed the smallest birds in our presence. "8 The natives 
were also accustomed to warfare, although on a small scale with few casualties. Proud 
of their martial prowess, the Indians would often scalp or tear the eyes out of their 
victims as trophies or eat parts of the bodies of slain chiefs or brave warriors to 
increase their own courage. 9 
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The Indians of California lived with kinsmen in villages that varied in size from 
several hundred people to over one thousand occupants. Except for the Yuma Indians 
of the Mojave desert, the Dieguefios of the San Diego area, and the Y akuts of the San 
Joaquin Valley the natives had no tribal organization. They lived a peaceful existence 
and although lacking agriculture or domestic animals their food staples were fish and 
acorns which were gathered easily. 10 
Vastly outnumbered by this native population the Spanish adopted some 
guidelines to enable them to maintain control. Military policy in dealing with Indian 
problems featured mildness reinforced with certain, swift retribution if necessary. 
Likewise the Spanish effected a benevolent image by bearing both material gifts and the 
spiritual gift of salvation. For example Governor Felipe de Neve always presented 
small gifts to natives he met while traveling. Neve believed that the natives should be 
treated with respect because any offense against them could have serious consequences 
due to the small military force at his disposal.ll 
To prevent offenses from occurring, strict rules regulated the conduct of the 
soldiers. To protect native women from abuse all soldiers, including sergeants and 
corporals, were forbidden to enter the Indian villages for any reason, unless in the 
company of a mission father. All Indian labor must be freely given and paid and 
contracted in formal discussions between corporals and chiefs. To discourage theft 
Santa Barbara presidio troopers for a time were prohibited from owning cattle. Trade 
with local tribes had to be fair and no one was to be Christianized by force. Soldiers 
who committed offences were to be punished by flogging or imprisonment. To avoid 
arbitrary enforcement serious crimes perpetrated by Indians had to be reported to the 
governor who ordered the punishment. Investigations and formal trials also attempted 
to protect the rights of native defendants. Punished Indians were often given gifts of 
com upon release.l2 
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The mission, where the process of Christian conversion occumed, was the focal 
point of friction between white and Indian cultures. The Spanish, fully aware of the 
potential for trouble, assigned a guard detail consisting of a corporal and five soldiers 
for the Franciscan establishments. A day sentry was posted with a sword and a night 
watch carried a musket. Soldiers escorted the padres whenever they left the mission 
compound regardless of whether the priests wanted the protection. Troopers were even 
to attend mass wearing their leather jackets and armed with shields, muskets, and 
swords but this rule apparently was not observed.l3 , 
The missionaries appreciated the necessity of a military presence at the 
missions. Father Fermin Francisco de Lasuen, continually asking for increased 
protection, complained the soldiers often lose their fear of hostile action and neglect 
their guard duty. California mission president Estevan Tapis reported to the viceroy in 
1804 that the guard details were inadequate to deal with revolt because the soldiers 
were often sick or busy with other duties.l4 
Events had proven that these fears were justified, as trouble began at the 
missions from the outset of the Franciscan presence in the region. Shortly after Father 
Serra proclaimed the first California mission at San Diego in July, 1769, natives often 
came into the Spanish camp to steal and even attempted to board the ship San Carlos in 
the harbor. Fighting finally resulted after the local tribesmen tried to take bedding from 
the sick. A volley from the soldiers killed three natives, wounded several others, and 
curbed the theft problem. A stockade was soon built around the mission.lS 
Six years later San Diego was the site of the only major mission revolt during 
the Spanish period. During the early morning hours of November 5, 1775, a group of 
800 Indians attacked the mission. A second planned assault by another 1,000 natives on 
the presidio never materialized. The natives set several buildings on fire and killed the 
mission blacksmith, carpenter, and Father Luis Jay me. The four sentries, although 
wounded and surrounded in a small adobe kitchen, defended the remaining Spaniards 
until morning when the warrors retreated. The reason for the revolt is somewhat 
obscure, but it was believed that two runaway neophytes initiated the raid, apparently 
fearful that the Franciscans would convert all the local villages to Christianity .16 
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In 1778 the Spanish discovered a further threat to the San Diego mission. Four 
local village chiefs prepared a stack of weapons to be used in an attack on the 
missionary establishment. A warning sent to the chiefs brought only a defiant reply so a 
small force of ten soldiers launched an early morning surprise attack on the village. 
The troopers killed several Indians and destroyed a large cache of bows, arrows, and 
clubs. The soldiers captured the four chiefs and took them to the presidio where they 
were tried and executed before a firing squad. The chiefs had broken a pardon given 
them for a previous attempt at rebellion. 17 
Other missions experienced similar native resistance, especially during the early 
years of their existence. One month after the founding of the San Gabriel mission in 
September, 1771, a large group of local warriors attacked two soldiers. The troopers 
shot and killed a chief, decapitated the corpse, and impaled the severed head on a pole 
as a warning. The tribesmen later told the mission fathers that the attack was in 
retaliation for a soldier's assault on an Indian woman of a nearby village. At the 
founding of Santa Clara Mission in 1777 local natives stole some mules belonging to 
soldiers. A military detatchment from the Monterey presidio raided a village and caught 
the thieves roasting the animals. A firefight ensued and the soldiers killed three Indians. 
Natives shot arrows at the San Francisco mission during its founding. IS 
Even when established the missions suffered problems. In 1776 Indians burned 
the San Luis Obispo mission and in the same year some warriors threatened Father 
Serra and his military escort near San Gabriel. The following year a Spanish force 
attacked some villagers near Mission San Juan Capistrano who had threatened local 
neophytes. Three Indians were killed. In 1819 a party of Yumas from the Colorado 
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River region killed two soldiers at San Buena Ventura Mission when refused permission 
to trade with the neophytes and locked in the guardhouse.l9 
The natives did not limit their acts of resistance to the missionary 
establishments. Pack trains and dispatch riders were also inviting targets. In 1775 a 
northbound pack train was attacked along the Santa Barbara coast. Two years later 
tribesmen ambushed four soldiers with dispatches near San Diego. The corporal in 
command was killed and the other troopers managed to escape only after an hour-long 
battle. In 1778 warriors killed another soldier near San Diego and wounded two others. 
Governor Neve ordered an escort of five soldiers for mail dispatches due to the 
attacks.20 
The primary Spanish tactic in controlling the native population was to send 
military expeditions, during which the presidial forces took full advantage of their 
superior mobility, firepower, and protection. Groups of soldiers traveled on horseback 
for days or even weeks and attempted to stage an early morning surprise assault on the 
targeted village. Generally troopers fired carbines and pistols first and then executed an 
mounted charge followed by close quarter combat with the lance and short sword. The 
California tribesmen found it difficult to kill the presidial soldier protected with his 
heavy leather coat and shield. Often the Spanish military would use large numbers of 
mission neophytes as auxiliary soldiers on these expeditions. These natives would use 
their own traditional weapons. 21 
The effectiveness of Spanish tactics was proven when Indians attacked Father 
Lasuen and a small military escort in a tribal village along the Santa Barbara coast. 
Initially the soldiers' guns misfired and later shots were ineffective. Retreating to level 
ground wh€1re their horses could be used to advantage twelve soldiers charged with 
lance and sword and killed six warriors, ending native resistance. No soldiers were 
wounded despite a large number of arrows fired. 22 
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The native warriors were intentionally denied the weapons and mobility 
available to the presidiallancers. By viceregal command the Indians could not ride or 
handle horses, although the missionaries would use neophyte vaqueros to manage the 
horse herds due to inadequate Spanish help. The sale or giving of arms to tribesmen 
was also strictly prohibited. Troopers even collected discarded lance points and bits of 
broken knives and returned them to the presidio. 23 
Allowed only traditional means of defense the warriors initially stood in masses 
and fired swarms of arrows. Discovering their missiles to be useless against the lancer's 
leather armor they resorted to guerrilla tactics of ambush and retreat or sniping from 
cover. In some instances the natives even dug trenches in villages to use as 
fortifications to prevent mounted attacks. Often the natives in the interior of California 
would retreat into the tule swamps after battle to discourage determined pursuit. 
Despite the somewhat futile nature of these tactics the Indians' constant resistance 
limited Spanish settlement to the coastal region. 24 
Because the leather jacket soldiers were the only armed force in the province 
and the presidios provided the sole means of confinement the Spanish military served as 
the police force for the entire community, including the missions. As a result, 
expeditions were undertaken for a variety of reasons. Sorties were sent out after 
deserters, runaway neophytes, native horse and cattle thieves, tribesmen suspected of 
crimes, and recalcitrants. Expeditions were also sent out to discover new mission sites, 
explore unknown territory, or to evangelize natives. Even these peaceful campaigns 
often involved skirmishes with warriors as the Indians resented the white intrusion into 
native lands. 25 
Most expeditions undertaken in the first years of the Spanish occupation were 
exploratory or evangelical and generally found peaceful and friendly natives. As the 
Franciscans began to bring more natives to their establishments the soldiers encountered 
increasingly hostile Indians who had heard negative tales of mission life. The 
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campaigns became more punitive and by 1813 most expeditions endeavored to capture 
neophyte runaways or punish hostile native villages. A dispatch by Governor Jose 
Joaquin Arrillaga to his presidial commanders illustrated the change in emphasis. He 
wrote that "By frequent expeditions on the part of the commander we might be able to 
achieve their [the Indians] total conquest or reduction." By 1820 the natives of the 
interior valleys and hills, where many mission fugitives fled, had a general behavior of 
physical resistance to the presidia! forces. 26 
Indian attacks usually brought quick retaliation to demonstrate Spanish strength 
and will. In 1797 raids on Mission San Miguel's cattle herd resulted in a punitive 
expedition by nine soldiers. The same year twenty-two soldiers left San Francisco 
Presidio to punish natives who had attacked a group of neophytes searching for 
runaways. A pitched battle in a village left two soldiers wounded and seven natives 
killed. The expedition returned with eighty-three fugitive Christians and nine prisoners. 
In 1798 warriors killed eight neophytes near Mission San Juan Bautista. A retaliatory 
raid left one chief dead and four tribesmen captured. In 1805 warriors ambushed two 
soldiers escorting a San Jose Mission father on a sick call to a native village. A soldier 
and three neophytes were killed. The Spanish quickly launched a punitive expedition 
led by a sergeant with thirty-three troopers. The Spanish killed ten of the offending 
tribesmen near the San Joaquin River. Finally, in 1810 eighteen soldiers attacked a 
village across San Francisco Bay to punish the killers of sixteen mission neophytes. The 
lancers battled 120 warriors before killing several and capturing eighteen.27 
Expeditions to return fugitive mission neophytes often resulted in battles with 
large groups of hostile warriors in the interior valleys of California. In 1813 thirteen 
soldiers and one hundred neophyte auxiliaries traveled to the San Joaquin Valley in 
search of runaways from Mission San Jose. They attacked a large village at dawn but 
the tribe had been previously warned of the impending conflict. The assault force soon 
faced over one thousand warriors but managed to repulse them with gunfire. The battle 
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lasted three hours before the tribesmen retreated into the marshes. The Spanish killed a 
"considerable" number of warriors while losing one auxiliary native.28 
Two years later thirty troopers searched the King's River and Tulare Lake 
region for neophyte fugitives. The lancers raided numerous villages, captured 
runaways, and slew several Indians in a firefight. The leather jackets also found 238 
stolen horses that tribesmen had slaughtered for food.29 
By 1819 Indians were stealing horses to increase their mobility in combat and 
there was concern that California might become a battle ground similar to the 
southwestern borderlands where lancers had to face mounted Apache raiders. An 
expedition of twenty soldiers with an auxiliary force of mission neophytes departed 
from San Francisco with the purpose of recovering stolen horses from some local 
tribesmen. The two forces met in battle near the present-day city of Stockton. Native 
arrows killed one auxiliary and wounded three or four soldiers. The missile attack was 
met by gunfire and a charge with lances that killed twenty warriors. The Indians fled 
leaving behind twenty wounded, sixteen prisoners, and forty-nine horses. 30 
The same year a large expedition was sent against the Colorado River tribes 
who had occasionally caused trouble in the province. Thirty-five cavalrymen, fifteen 
foot soldiers and four artillerymen armed with a small cannon were joined by a large 
force of Indian auxiliaries. This unit, unable to find enough forage or water in the arid 
Mojave Desert, had to return without experiencing combat. 31 
The last major military expedition of the Spanish era is noteworthy because it 
was directed against whites and not Indians. In 1821 Governor Vicente Sola heard 
rumors of an English or American party established about one hundred miles north of 
San Francisco. Sola sent a formidible force of four officers, thirty-five cavalry, twenty 
infantry and a cannon to drive the intruders out. The unit traveled up the Sacramento 
Valley as far north as present-day Shasta or Weaverville but found no foreigners. The 
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troops did fight minor skirmishes with natives before they returned to their base at San 
Francisco. 32 
A less dangerous foe to the Spanish military in California but one that 
nonetheless caused concern among the royal authorities were American and Russian 
traders and fur trappers. Beginning in 1796 Yankee traders began to operate off the 
California coast, moving south from their previous base of operations in the Pacific 
Northwest. Competition with the Russian American Company and increasingly violent 
incidents with hostile northwest coastal tribes caused 'the Americans to try bartering 
trade goods for otter pelts with the Spaniards instead. The Yankees then took the pelts 
to China and sold them for a large profit. However, California regulations in effect 
since 1774 revealed the mercantile attitude of the royal administrators. Trade between 
the province's residents and foreign vessels was prohibited. One of the roles of the 
presidia! forces was to enforce these regulations. 33 
The Spanish were not solely concerned with illegal enterprise. They also feared 
that the Americans would use the information gathered from the traders about the 
California coasts and launch an attack on the province. Another concern was a hostile 
vessel masquerading as a Yankee trader entering the California ports during wartime. 
At one point in 1803 the royal authorities even suspected that two well-armed Yankee 
ships, the Hazard and the Alexander, might attempt to capture the capital at Monterey. 
The effort to stop the American presence was motivated by more than economic 
concerns. 34 
A typical Yankee ruse was to sail into port claiming to need supplies or repairs 
in order to continue the voyage. The sea captain then surreptitiously traded for otter 
skins and obtained supplies to continue trading along the coast with Indians, mission 
fathers, or even soldiers. Presidia! commanders soon became aware of the ship's true 
purpose, however, and posted guards to closely watch the activities of the crew.35 
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Eventually Yankee persistence and enforcement of viceregal law collided in 
armed conflict. In March, 1803, the Lelia Byrd commanded by William Shaler and 
Richard Cleveland sailed into San Diego harbor and requested supplies. Presidio 
commander Manuel Rodriguez placed guards aboard the vessel and ordered the ship to 
leave the next day after reprovisioning. That night Rodrlguez arrested three sailors who 
had rowed ashore attempting to trade and kept them under guard on the beach. The 
following morning, upon hearing of the sailors' captivity, Shaler and Cleveland first 
disarmed the ship's guard then rowed to the beach where they freed their crewmen at 
gunpoint. Returning to the ship, they prepared to run past the castillo guarding the 
entrance to the harbor. Despite exposing the captured guards on deck Shaler and 
Cleveland began receiving fire from the battery as they moved with a slow wind to the 
harbor entrance. When abreast of the Spanish guns the ship and castillo exchanged 
broadsides and the Lelia Byrd received a hole in the side. Shaler claimed his fire caused 
the royal forces to abandon their guns except for one soldier on the ramparts waving his 
hat to urge the ship to cease fire. The American captains sailed out of the bay and soon 
released their Spanish captives. 36 
The battle at San Diego and other increased Yankee activity caused the Spanish 
authorities to adopt a tougher stance against the traders. Viceroy Jose de Iturrigaray 
proposed sending a warship to cruise the California coast and establishing a mission 
and military guard on one of the Santa Barbara channel islands. Although the Spaniards 
never occupied the islands the viceroy sent the frigate Princesa in 1806 to patrol the 
coast. That same year Governor Arrillaga issued strict instructions to presidial 
commanders that no supplies be given to foreign vessels and a guard posted to prevent 
any transactions between ship and shore. 37 
This new Spanish policy made it difficult or impossible for the Americans to do 
business on the California coast. Turning to the Russian American company which was 
operating off northwest shores the Yankees borrowed Aleut fur trappers which they 
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transported to California waters and kept supplied in small camps. The Americans and 
Russians agreed to split the profits. Operations began in late 1803 and by 1806 four 
Yankee ships were involved 38. 
This violation of Spanish sovereignty quickly led to conflict with the presidia! 
troopers. In April, 1806, three sailors from the Peacock were captured and imprisoned 
at San Diego while ashore for supplies. Three months later Captain Joseph O'Cain led 
fifteen armed men ashore in Baja California, captured four soldiers and threatened to 
destroy both the San Diego castillo and presidio unless the three sailors were released. 
The commandant refused this demand and O'Cain later lost five more men to capture in 
Baja California. 39 In September, 1807, seven Aleuts were imprisoned in the San 
Francisco presidio and in October five more were taken. Two years later a patrol of 
nine men from the same presidio intercepted seventeen Aleuts who had landed in San 
Francisco Bay. The presidia! troopers killed four hunters in the ensuing firefight. In 
May, 1811, a patrol of twenty men killed two Aleuts in a night ambush. San Francisco 
soldiers greatly reduced hunting in their region by guarding fresh water supplies and 
closely observing the harbor. 40 
In 1814 and 1815 vigorous military enforcement essentially ended foreign fur 
trapping in Spanish California waters. In July, 1814, eleven Aleuts were captured by 
lancers after going ashore to purchase fresh meat at San Pedro. Two months later a 
patrol ambushed Russian American Company official Boris Tarasov and twenty-seven 
trappers. Tarasov and twenty-four were captured and imprisoned in Los Angeles. In 
September, 1815, fourteen soldiers from Santa Barbara ambushed twenty-two men at 
Refugio and captured seven. 41 
As fur trapping activities were being curtailed opportunities opened for legal 
trade. The beginning of the Mexican revolution in 1810 had disrupted the regular 
supply service from San Bias in Baja California and made the authorities in California 
more receptive to the Yankee traders. The last decade of the Spanish era witnessed 
inconsistent enforcement of the mercantile regulations by the military forces. 
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In 1812 California residents welcomed Captain George Eayrs but on a return 
voyage the following year his ship Mercury was boarded and captured while at anchor 
at San Luis Obispo by fifteen men from the Spanish merchant vessel Flora. In 
December, 1815, twelve lancers from Santa Barbara almost captured several sailors 
from the Forester as they landed to get fresh beef at the same harbor the Mercury was 
taken. In January, 1816, troopers disrupted two trading voyages at Refugio by 
capturing Captain William Smith and five men from the Albatross who had landed for 
"provisions" and taking Captain Henry Gyzelaar with his crew and ship Lydia. The 
men and ships were later released. In 1816 Governor Sola approved the trade of two 
Yankee ships, the Sultan and Atala, partly because some soldiers desperately needed 
cloth for their uniforms. The following year Captain James Wilcocks also received 
approval from Sola. In 1821 Captain Eliab Grimes was able to conduct business with 
Commandante Jose de la Guerra at the Santa Barbara presidio but San Diego 
commander Jose Estudillo refused him permission to trade. 42 
A far more dangerous seaborne threat was an invasion by a foreign country or 
by Latin American revolutionaries. These rivals possessed both the firepower and 
manpower to decisively defeat the small presidia! forces and occupy the province. 
Rumors of such an attack had occured throughout the Spanish era. In 1776 the viceroy 
warned Governor Felipe de Neve not to allow English captain James Cook to land or 
discover the extent of California's defenses. Cook did not appear. In 1780 war between 
England and Spain caused Neve concern over a possible invasion by British admiral 
Hughes. In 1794 royal engineer Costans6' s California defense report warned the 
viceroy of a British threat to the province. In 1796 seventy-two Catalan ·volunteers 
reinforced the province because of the war with France. The Yankee traders were seen 
as forerunners to a possible American invasion. 43 
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The Spanish authorities were aware that their forces were not adequate to repel 
such an attack. Governor Neve complained that with so many troops on guard duty at 
the missions there were not enough to protect the presidio. Armed escorts traveled with 
dispatches and pack trains which further reduced available manpower. Governor Sola 
reported to the viceroy that their long experience in using frontier tactics against 
Indians rendered presidia! companies incapable of fighting an enemy with firearms. The 
presidios were not built to withstand a European style assault. 44 
Such an attack did appear. On October 6, 1818 the American brig Clarion 
arrived at Santa Barbara where Captain Henry Gyzelaar warned the commander that 
two ships were fitted out in Hawaii for an attack on California. This information was 
sent to Governor Sola. On November 20 the two ships under the command of 
Hippolyte Bourchard, a Frenchman operating as a privateer for General San Martin's 
insurgent forces in South America, arrived at Monterey. Bourchard was captain of the 
Argentina with forty-four guns and a crew of 260. An Englishman, Peter Corney, 
commanded the Santa Rosa with eighteen guns and one hundred sailors. Their exact 
purpose in making an attack on California is somewhat unclear. Lacking the forces to 
occupy the province perhaps they expected its inhabitants to join them in common 
cause or possibly they were after plunder and the chance to defeat royal forces. 45 
At dawn on November 21 the Santa Rosa began cannonading the castillo which 
promptly returned fire. However the gun duel was ineffective because the battery was 
located at an elevation too high for the ship to hit. An improvised three gun battery on 
the beach damaged the Santa Rosa to the extent that after two hours of battle the ship's 
flag was lowered in a token of surrender and three men sent shore to request a cease 
fire. These men were sent by Sola to the guardhouse. The presidia! soldiers had fought 
well at the castillo, Sola reporting that they "bore themselves with an unspeakable 
serenity despite the balls that were falling about them." Bourchard later sent an officer 
with a flag of truce to Sola demanding surrender of the province, which the governor 
defiantly refused. 46 
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The troopers remained at arms all night in a drizzle while families evacuated the 
presidio and went to Soledad Mission. The following morning the Argentina landed 
nine boats loaded with a large force at Point Pinos, three miles west of the castillo. 47 
Sola sent a cavalry force of twenty-five soldiers under Ensign Jose Estrada to intercept 
them but greatly outnumbered, he retreated. Hawaiian islanders armed with pikes led a 
charge up the hill behind the castillo and hauled down the royal flag. The Spanish 
mounted their horses and retreated. After taking the battery the insurgents turned the 
guns on the presidio where the royal forces tried to make a stand. After firing a few 
rounds Corney led an assault against the presidio where the defenders fired their field 
pieces and fled. The establishment was entered without opposition. Sola retreated with 
all forces to Rancho del Rey, approximately ten miles distant at the present-day city of 
Salinas.48 
Monterey was plundered and the barracks, king' s stores and governor's house 
were all burnt. Bourchard' s losses had been three killed and three captured although 
several intoxicated insurgents were unfit for duty after the town was sacked. Sola was 
reinforced by soldiers from San Francisco and San Jose, but he decided not to 
counterattack. After several days Bourchard left and sailed southward. 49 
On December 4 the insurgents landed at Refugio and plundered the Ortega 
Ranch after the inhabitants had fled. Lancers from Santa Barbara Presidio lassod three 
sailors who had wandered from the main landing party and took them to the presidio. 
Bourchard sailed into Santa Barbara harbor two days later and demanded the release of 
the three crewmen in return for sparing the presidio and the exchange of a Spaniard 
captured at Monterey. This arrangement was completed and Bourchard again sailed 
south, stopping at Mission San Juan Capistrano on December 14 for supplies. The 
mission was abandoned upon the insurgents' approach and although Bourchard' s force 
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was watched by troopers from San Diego, there was no fight given. After obtaining a 
few provisions Bourchard sailed south into Mexican waters. The short campaign had 
ended.so 
The presidial soldiers maintained Spain's precarious sovereignty over California 
by a combination of valor and good fortune. Although small in numbers they were 
energetic in pursuing combat with both internal and external foes. However the 
troopers were also fortunate that the subjugated native population never united 
effective! y to oppose them and that foreign powers like England or France were 
indifferent to the possession of the province. The loss of California's strongest position, 
Monterey, to a small privateer force indicates the weak position of the territory. 
Nevertheless, Spanish sovereignty was maintained for fifty years in an isolated 
province against a number of different challenges. That this was accomplished by a 
small, ill-trained and inadequately supplied force is a significant achievement in the 
history of Spain's borderlands. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
A study of Spain's California soldiers places them alongside the mission fathers 
in deserving recognition for their role in colonizing and controlling the province. Each 
aspect of the trooper's experience presented by this thesis reveals their challenges and 
achievements. 
Perhaps the successful colonization of Spanish California was the most 
significant accomplishment. Notably, this was achieved by military personnel 
denigrated by the mission fathers for poor character and social background. Certain 
factors mitigated the padres' judgment and made the frontier soldiers good choices for 
the task of colonization. A borderlands background created the self-reliant population 
necessary to survive an inadequate supply link with New Spain. If royal authorities had 
sent urban colonial units or regular regiments from Spain to the isolated territory the 
effort might have failed. Furthermore, the emphasis upon posting married troopers in 
California over time certainly produced a generally more stable, responsible soldier 
than that often reviled by the missionaries. The second generation of recruits was 
generally raised at the presidios, providing soldiers accustomed to a martial 
atmosphere. It is noteworthy that visiting foreign military professionals from Britain 
and Russia commented favorably regarding the quality of personnel they found. The 
result was a stable community that represented the only permanent Hispanic settlements 
in the colony, the mission system collapsing when secularized during the Mexican era. 
The Spanish authorities possessed no illusions regarding the inadequacy of 
California's physical defenses. Royal engineers, the province's governors, Yankee 
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traders, and foreign officers all recognized that any serious attempt to conquer the 
province would succeed. The Nootka Sound incident, the 1812 Russian establishment 
of Fort Ross in northern California, and the Bourchard raid indicated potential 
challenges to New Spain's control. Although these threats were more apparent than 
real, an established military presence was believed necessary. The challenge to the 
California troopers was not to defeat a foreign assault but to maintain the presidios and 
castillos as deterrents to infringements upon Spanish sovereignty. This was achieved 
despite inadequate supplies of weaponry and proper building materials, unskilled 
workmanship, small presidio musters, general deterioration and poor weather 
conditions at San Francisco and Monterey. With the exception of the short time the 
royal engineers Costans6 and C6rdoba spent in the province, there was no professional 
management of the defense bastions. Even after construction a constant lack of 
personnel in general and trained gunners in particular made the physical defenses even 
less intimidating than they seemed. The province's strongest fortification, the castillo at 
Monterey, was easily taken by Bourchard. However, in 1821 the presidios still 
remained where they had been established and were viable military communities. 
Today they remain as California population centers, long after the original walls have 
crumbled to dust. 
Overall the conditions of service became generally favorable after the military 
and religious elements were firmly established. Plentiful food, controlled prices, and 
opportunity for promotion and land ownership were positive aspects of service in the 
province. Strict discipline and a full routine were made more tolerable by fair treatment 
in accordance with regulations. 
Mission guard detail was the most important duty performed by the troopers. 
The missions were both the chief agent for reduction of the natives and the province's 
agricultural backbone. Adequate protection of the religious compounds and their 
missionaries was vital to Spain's California enterprise. Soldiers not only had to contend 
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with potential violence from the large neophyte populations but with the strict 
Franciscan rules and the temptation of Indian women. Despite occasional lapses in 
discipline and disagreements with the padres, the presence of soldiers ensured the 
growth of neophyte populations and mission agriculture and ranching. Troopers 
pursued runaways, patrolled the compounds, supervised the livestock and farming 
activities, directed construction efforts, and escorted the missionaries. Soldiers are the 
forgotten factors in the success of the California missions whose produce and livestock 
enabled the military community to survive. 
Regulations attempted to provide the frontier fighter with adequate weaponry to 
deter threats to royal control of the province. However, supply difficulties and small 
presidio garrisons produced a force that was barely sufficient to control the native 
population. Added to this task was the often violent enforcement of sovereignty and 
mercantile regulations against Yankee traders and Russian fur trappers. Conquest by 
foreign powers always remained a possibility, and an attack by Latin American 
revolutionaries became a reality. Despite the meagre forces available, the military 
record is a good one. The settled areas remained under firm royal control despite 
Indian resistance. Russians and Yankees eventually abandoned their fur trapping 
activities due to interference from the province's troopers. Yankee trade ships were 
closely monitored until finally welcomed during the last decade of viceregal rule. 
Soldiers built, manned, and maintained the castillos to prevent rival powers from 
conquering the territory's vital ports. The Bourchard raid revealed the precarious nature 
of California's military establishment. 
Today all of the Spanish missions have been rebuilt as a reminder of the 
missionaries' role in developing the Golden State. Only one presidio at Santa Barbara is 
being restored to its original form. Perhaps it will serve as a reminder that California's 
soldiers played more than a secondary role during the Spanish colonial era. 
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